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This Joint Applied Project analyzed the extent to which Army leadership has 
acknowledged and is acting upon key improvement recommendations made by the 
Gansler Report (2007). This project explores roles, procedures, principles and emerging 
issues facing contingency contracting professionals in respect to their responsibilities in 
expeditionary operations. Basic principles of contingency contracting and current 
literature relative to Army expeditionary operations were analyzed. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with both military and civilian acquisition professionals. 
Additionally, researcher developed surveys were distributed amongst deployed 
contingency contracting officers/specialists in order to approach this topic with a ‘boots 
on the ground’ perspective.  From the research conducted, recommendations are provided 
that the Army can implement to improve modern wartime contingency contracting and 
better prepare and train the contracting workforce to support future contingency 
operations.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Joint Applied Project analyzed  the  extent to which Army leadership  has 
acknowledged and is acting upon key improvement recommendations made by the 
Gansler Report (2007), e.g., Independent Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations, chaired by Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, former 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). This project 
explored roles, procedures, principles and emerging issues facing contingency 
contracting professionals in respect to their responsibilities in expeditionary operations. 
Basic principles of contingency contracting and current literature relative to Army 
expeditionary operations were analyzed.  Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with both military and civilian acquisition professionals. Additionally, researcher 
developed surveys were distributed amongst deployed contingency contracting 
officers/specialists in order to approach this topic with a ‘boots on the ground’ 
perspective.   
From the research conducted, recommendations are provided that the Army can 
implement to improve modern wartime contingency contracting and better prepare and 
train the contracting workforce to support future contingency operations.  To begin such a 
discussion, it is necessary to identify the Army’s contingency contracting problems and 
purpose for this research. 
A. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND PURPOSE 
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has seen 
substantial changes in procurement structures, policies and practices.  One major shift 
concerns the procurement of systems and technologies that fall outside of the traditional 
peace-time supply chain.  The commercial marketplace increasingly emerged as an 
untapped defense resource, particularly since the commercial industry bears the brunt of 
R&D costs.   Overall, industry competitors strive to steadily improve upon existing 
technologies, much to the delight of their defense customers.  The DoD attempts to 
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balance the tension between reducing the costs of expensive programs with purchasing 
and incorporating the latest commercial technologies into its requirements.    
The 1990s can be depicted as a time of further changes in military strategic and 
operational structures, including reorganizing business practices coupled with a persistent 
downsizing of the acquisition workforce. Multiple changes have affected the DoDs 
ability to procure the necessary hardware and services needed to support the largest 
organization in the world.   Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) have revealed that the DoD must place a renewed focus upon the Acquisition 
profession to ensure that the U.S. can remain a dominant player in the global 
environment. During OEF, OIF and the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the 
responsibilities and skills of Army contingency contracting personnel have expanded and 
become more complex. When placed within the context of exponential developments in 
information technology, Army overseas contracting personnel are struggling to keep up, 
and struggling under increased workloads.  Faced with limited resources and multiple 
agency accusations of waste, fraud, and abuse, the Army appears to be getting serious 
about ways to fundamentally improve upon its current procurement system and the 
personnel charged with operating and evaluating it; in both conventional and 
unconventional contracting situations.  
In 2007, the Secretary of the Army established an Independent Commission on 
Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations referred to as 
the Gansler Commission. The Commission was chaired by Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, 
former Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and was 
tasked to review the Army’s policies, procedures, and operations in contingency 
environments. The board provided key improvement recommendations to assist the Army 
in attaining an improved procurement process to support current and future contracting 
operations. 
The Gansler Commission findings and recommendations are the central starting 




degree of acceptance toward what the Gansler Commission states needs to be done, as 
well as, the current initiatives that the Army has undertaken to implement the Gansler 
recommendations.  
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This Joint Applied Project evaluated current Army contracting procedures and the 
Army’s response to the Gansler Commission report. The research and analysis resulted in 
the provision of recommendations on how the Army can continue to move forward and 
substantially improve its contingency contracting process and workforce to fit the 
demands of its war-time context.  Interview and survey responses were used to draw 
conclusions and to develop potential tools to assist leaders, managers, and contracting 
practitioners improve upon modern wartime contingency contracting and better prepare 
and train a contracting workforce to support future contingency contracting operations.    
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How have the roles, responsibilities, procedures, and challenges of U.S. 
Army contract specialists changed to accommodate wartime needs and 
expectations? 
2. How is Army leadership responding to contingency contracting key 
improvement recommendations for changes, including acknowledgement of 
weaknesses, plans to solve charges of waste and inefficiency, and 
overcoming implementation impediments?   
3. How is the Army developing more and better trained contract professionals? 
4. What “contracting tools,” procedures and/or personnel policy modifications 
could be considered as ways to augment and stabilize the contingency 
contracting community’s ability to perform in the context of a long war? 
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D. ORGANIZATION/METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH 
Research for this project was conducted primarily through literary searches on the 
subject of contingency contracting, as well as, information pertaining to the Gansler 
Commission report. Literature was analyzed from Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) reports, DoD directives and publications, and other documents including theses 
from the Naval Postgraduate School. Four key improvement issues facing Army 
contingency contracting are described in Chapter III. Comparison analysis was used to 
juxtapose literature findings, government reports, and researcher generated interviews 
and surveys to identify commonalities. Additionally, a researcher developed survey 
(Appendix A) was distributed to contingency contracting officers and specialists 
deployed throughout the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).  
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions pertain:  
1. Research for this study was conducted during 2007 and the first half of 
2008. Implementation of the Gansler Report recommendations is not 
viewed as a ‘one time fix’; rather a long term endeavor involving 
recruiting, training and sustainment of a sufficient contracting workforce 
able to meet current and future war-time demands. 
2. The Yoder Three-Tier Model of contingency contracting is used as a 
theoretical foundation and guide for analysis. A brief overview of this 
model is contained in Appendix B. 
3. Both military and civilian DoD contracting personnel were surveyed for 
this research. Survey results may or may not reflect the overall Army 
position concerning contingency contracting.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter I identified the nature, scope and structure of the thesis.   Chapter II 
provides a basic overview of contingency contracting terms and policies. Chapter III 
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identifies problems with Army contingency contracting. Chapter IV discusses the Gansler 
Commission’s findings and resulting recommendations. Chapter V analyzes the Army’s 
formal response, current initiatives and actions taken to implement these 
recommendations. Chapter VI analyzes survey and interview results.  Chapter VII details 
conclusions, recommendations and areas for further research.   
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 7
II. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
During operations supporting the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Army 
contingency contracting roles have expanded and become more complex. Stimulated by 
exponential developments in information technology, Army overseas contracting 
personnel are also experiencing the need for increasingly specialized contracting 
expertise and training to accomplish warfare missions.  Increased demand has generated 
an influx of private contractors on the battlefield.  Metrics indicate there are more 
contractors on the battlefield than ever before; as of 2007, State and Defense department 
figures show 180,000 civilians working in Iraq under United States (U.S.) contracts.1 
This number exceeds the total number of armed forces in theater. Contracting in 
contingency operations, in particular, has risen to the forefront of providing essential 
background support to time-sensitive mission objectives in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Over the past several years, contingency 
contracting support has grown from simplified acquisition procedures to complex defense 
system acquisitions, interagency support, services, and military construction. Regardless 
of this rapid transition, contingency contracting personnel are responsible for maintaining 
accurate and complete contract files in a complex and high threat environment. They 
have to adapt to new procedures, new technology, and new scheduling demands, i.e., 
civilian contracting personnel deploy overseas on a volunteer basis only. 
Faced with limited resources, a changing front-line war environment, and multiple 
agency accusations of waste, fraud, and abuse, the Army is looking for ways to better 
prepare the contingency contracting workforce to support conventional and 
unconventional contracting situations. In 2007 the Secretary of the Army established an 
Independent Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. The Commission was chaired by Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, 
former Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), and was 
                                                 
1 T. Christian Miller. (July 2007). Private Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in Iraq: New U.S. data 
show how heavily the Bush administration has relied on corporations to carry out the occupation of the 
war-torn nation. Los Angeles Time, p. 1. 
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tasked to review the Army’s policies, procedures, and operations in contingency 
environments, and to recommend necessary changes to ensure that future military 
operations achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency.2  
The recommendations made by the Gansler Commission are discussed in Chapter 
IV, and comprise a central theme of this report, i.e., how has Army leadership formally 
acknowledged and begun acting-upon the Gansler Commission recommendations; 
including identifying implementation impediments. To begin such a discussion, a basic 
knowledge of contingency contracting terms and processes is provided.   
A.  CONTINGENCY DEFINED 
A contingency is an event that requires the deployment of military forces in 
response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law and order, 
political instability, or other military operations.3 A contingency operation may either be 
declared or non-declared. In accordance with 10 U.S.C. 101(a) (13), a declared 
contingency of the DoD may be either:  
a. Designated by the Secretary of Defense when members 
of the Armed Forces may become involved in military 
actions against an enemy of the United States and/or; 
b. Declared by the President or the Congress when 
members of the uniformed forces are called on active 
duty (a reserve component mobilization) under Title 10 
U.S.C. or any provision of law during a declared war or 
national emergency. 
In contrast, a non-declared contingency operation is therefore all other DoD operations 
other than those described above.  
                                                 
2 United States Army. Independent Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (October 2007). Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, p1. 
Washington, DC. 
3 Cory E. Yoder, CDR.  (October 2007). Contingency Contracting Operations: Achieving Better 
Results.  MN3318 Contingency Contracting Course. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.   
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 The distinction between a declared contingency and a non-declared contingency is 
crucial in the contracting community. The declaration of a contingency operation 
authorizes the relaxation, and in some cases, elimination of the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FAR) and most service policies. The intent of the ‘relaxation’ of policy is to 
ensure that support to contingency operations is as efficient and effective as possible.  
FAR Part 18 entitled, “Emergency Acquisitions” details many of the streamlined 
processes. Examples include, but are not limited to:  
• Increase in the simplified acquisition threshold; 
• Increase in micro-purchase threshold; 
• Removal of synopsis requirement; and 
• Waiver of Competition in Contracting Act (CICA). 
B. TYPES OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
Throughout history, members of the U.S. Armed Forces have deployed 
worldwide in support of many types of national objectives, such as emergency situations 
caused by natural disasters, wars, terrorist activities, and/or political instability.  The 
services have been called upon for rescue and humanitarian relief efforts, and efforts to 
protect U.S. interests during demonstrations of force and raids. The volatile, urgent, and 
uncertain nature of these efforts creates the need for advanced planning, rapid response, 
and flexible procedures during support of a contingency operation. The types of 
contingencies involved and the maturity of the operational environment influence the 
extent to which contracting support is utilized. There are four main types of DoD 
supported contingency operations: Major Theater War; Smaller Scale Contingencies; 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW); and Domestic Disaster/Emergency 
Relief operations. 
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1. Major Theater War  
In a Major Theater War, hostilities are ongoing, imminent or likely, and involve a 
substantial commitment of United States military forces.4  These types of operations are 
conflicts that engage an entire force structure within a specific geographic area. 
Contracting support is provided to supplement a vigorous Combat Support and Combat 
Service Support infrastructure. OIF and OEF are examples of Major Theater War. 
2. Smaller Scale Contingencies  
Support provided for Smaller Scale Contingencies are similar in nature to that 
provided for a Major Theater War. However, one key difference is that Smaller Scale 
Contingency operations are set in motion against a less compelling threat than those 
involved in Major Theater War. They also dedicate fewer U.S. Forces and have a more 
restricted time schedule.5 Operations URGENT FURY (Grenada) and JUST CAUSE 
(Panama) are two examples of U.S. support in Smaller Scale Contingencies.  
3. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) refer to a wide range of activities 
utilized by U.S. military forces to support operations other than large scale war. The main 
focus of these operations is to prevent war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support 
civil authorities in response to domestic crises.  They may involve both combat and 
noncombat operations.  MOOTW are generally conducted Outside the Continental 
United States (OCONUS); however some types may be conducted within the Continental 
United States (CONUS) in support of civil authorities consistent with established law. 
                                                 
4 Defense Acquisition University. (June 2005). Types of Contingencies: CON234, Student Guide 
Lesson 2 [PDF Document], pp. 2-7. Retrieved January 2008 from 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=34211&lang=en-US.  
5 Smaller-Scale Contingency (SSC). Global Security. Retrieved March 2008 from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/ssc.htm. 
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Operations Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq) and Uphold Democracy (Haiti) are two 
examples of MOOTW conducted by the U.S. over the past several years.6   
4. Domestic Disaster/Emergency Relief 
The spectrum of assistance provided during Domestic Disaster/Emergency Relief 
operations includes CONUS natural and man-made disasters, CONUS local community 
disturbances, and CONUS terrorist activity. However, the main focus of this type of 
support is to mitigate the effects of natural or man-made disasters such as, hurricanes, 
earthquakes, floods, oil spills, riots, and air, rail, or highway accidents. Notable DoD 
disaster relief efforts include clean-up and humanitarian assistance efforts resulting from 
Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Katrina. 
C. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
There are different interpretations on the meaning of ‘Contingency Contracting’. 
For purposes of this thesis, the Defense Acquisition University’s (DAU) CON234, 
“Contingency Contracting” course manual, defines Contingency Contracting as: Direct 
contracting support to tactical and operational forces engaged in the full spectrum of 
armed conflict and Military Operations Other Than War, both domestic and overseas.  
Therefore, contingency contracting is the process by which essential supplies and 
services are obtained on behalf of the U.S. Government to support deployed forces 
engaged in conflict in both CONUS and OCONUS locations. The definition of 
contingency contracting is purposely broad to include the four types of contingency 
operations discussed above. However, it intentionally excludes such efforts as military 
training exercises and routine installation and base operations. These types of efforts lack 
the element of immediate risk to human life or significant national interests.7 
                                                 
6 Joint Chiefs of Staff. (June 1990).  Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War (Joint Pub 
3-07), p I-1. Retrieved April 2008 from http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jp3-07.pdf. 
7 Defense Acquisition University. (June 2005). Types of Contingencies: CON234, Student Guide 
Lesson 2 [PDF Document], pp. 2-6. Retrieved January 2008 from 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=34211&lang=en-US. 
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D. CONTRACTING IN A CONTINGENCY ENVIRONMENT 
When planning for expeditionary operations, contingency contracting 
professionals consider the maturity level of the working area environment to determine 
the type and level of required contracting support.  Also considered is the amount of in-
theatre available resources to support contracting activities. For example, a Contingency 
Contracting Officer (CCO) would prepare for a contingency operation in Western Europe 
differently than in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Iran. A contingency environment can be 
classified as either mature or immature, as described below.  
A mature environment is one that can be characterized by a sophisticated 
infrastructure capable of supporting and sustaining operations for extensive periods of 
time. A mature environment can have all or a combination of the following 
characteristics:  
• Legal framework, such as, host-nation agreements; 
• Financial networks to support complex transactions; 
• Vigorous transportation systems; 
• Business capacity, capability, and willingness to interact.8   
One key aspect of a mature environment is its capability to quickly adapt to changing 
requirements and priorities. It will also consist of vendors and suppliers that have prior 
contracting experience with the U.S. Government and can comply with FAR 
requirements.  
In contrast, an immature contracting environment is one with little to none of the 
support infrastructure detailed above. There are few, if any, vendors to conduct business 
with, and most likely they have had no previous experience working with the U.S. 
Government.  
                                                 
8 Cory E. Yoder, CDR. (October 2007). Contingency Contracting Operations: Achieving Better 
Results [Power Point Slides]. MN3318 Contingency Contracting Course. Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California. 
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 While no two contingency contracting operations are alike, they fall into one or 
more of the four typical phases of a contingency; Mobilization/Initial Deployment, 
Buildup, Sustainment, and/or Termination/Redeployment. It is important for acquisition 
professionals to realize what phase of a contingency an operation falls within as it can 
assist them in gauging requirements needed to fulfill mission support. It is important to 
note that not all operations will follow the particular sequence detailed below.  
1. Mobilization/Initial Deployment 
The initial mobilization and deployment phase of an operation, normally the first 
30-45 days, can be one of the most stressful and confusing environments that an 
acquisition professional faces. As initial support architectures may not be available upon 
arrival, a contingency contracting officer may perform different roles in rapid sequence, 
e.g., initial requestor, approving official, certifying officer and transportation officer. The 
need to award contracts quickly upon arrival may be imperative. The number one priority 
of contracting professionals during this stage is to be responsive to providing basic life 
support requirements, security services, and support for arrival of the initial ground 
troops. These items can include food and water, shelter, utilities, transportation, fuel, 
sanitation, interpreters and guides.9   
A CCO expected to deploy during this phase of a contingency can plan ahead and 
obtain access to sample documents that may be needed for contract awards, e.g., 
statements of work, logs of available contract numbers, contract forms, and award 
checklists. They must remain flexible as the number of available contracting personnel 
during this phase of a contingency is limited. The predominant types of contract vehicles 
that are used during this phase of a contingency operation are SF44s/cash payments, 
Government-wide Commercial Purchase Cards, and Blanket Purchase Agreements 
(BPAs).10 
                                                 
9 Defense Acquisition University. (June 2005). Types of Contingencies: CON234, Student Guide 
Lesson 2 [PDF Document], pp. 2:5-6. Retrieved January 2008 from 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=34211&lang=en-US. 
10 Defense Acquisition University. (June 2005). Types of Contingencies: CON234, Student Guide 
Lesson 2 [PDF Document], pp. 2:5-6. 
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2. Buildup 
The buildup phase of a contingency operation, normally day 45 and forward, is 
generally a continuation of the initial deployment phase. The main body of troops to 
support the mission will arrive along with additional contracting personnel; however, it 
may not seem comparable to the number of troops that need the support. Again, the main 
focus is basic life support and security requirements, but attention must now also be 
given to:  
• Construction material; 
• Heavy equipment; 
• Quality of Life items (TV, VCR, gym equipment); 
• Office equipment. 
Additionally, the establishment of a contracting support office coupled with a solid and 
reliable vendor base is a key priority of this phase. The use of cash transactions is limited 
as the contracting office works towards establishment of BPAs with an Ordering Officer 
network.11 
3. Sustainment 
The sustainment phase of a contingency operation runs from the end of the 
buildup stage through the point that redeployment begins. Contracting activities will 
continue to focus on life support and quality of life requirements; however an increased 
focus will be given to providing permanent facilities and equipment, office supplies, and 
discretionary services.  
The main priority of a CCO and its support team will be on establishing long term 
Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts and BPAs that consolidate 
requirements to benefit from economies of scale and reducing costs. The improvement of 
                                                 
11 Defense Acquisition University. (June 2005). Types of Contingencies: CON234, Student Guide 
Lesson 2 [PDF Document], pp. 2-6. Retrieved January 2008 from 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=34211&lang=en-US. 
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contract files and documentation is crucial as internal controls are established to 
minimize waste and abuse. The contracting team will also focus on increasing 
competition amongst its vendor base and transitioning the workload for the next round of 
contracting personnel or termination and redeployment.12 
4. Termination and Redeployment 
This phase of a contingency operation will be characterized by an urgency to 
prepare the troops to go home or to deploy forward to other areas of operation. Focus on 
life support contracts will remain throughout the duration of the mission. New 
requirements may include packing and freight services, transportation of troops, and 
preparation for material and equipment for transfer.13  
Contracting personnel will be required to terminate and/or closeout existing 
contracts and orders. If redeployment is scheduled, they prepare the contract files and 
documentation for reassignment.   
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, basic contingency contracting procedures were discussed.   A 
definition of contingency contracting was offered and the following four main types of 
DoD supported contingency operations were discussed: Major Theater Wars, Smaller 
Scale Contingencies, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and Domestic 
Disaster/Emergency Relief operations. Mature versus immature contingency 
environments were explained, followed by the four typical phases of a contingency: 
Mobilization/Initial Deployment, Buildup, Sustainment, and/or 
Termination/Redeployment. Information in this chapter provided a basic understanding 
of contracting principles in contingency operations.  Chapter III identifies problems in 
Army contingency contracting. 
                                                 
12 Cory E. Yoder, CDR. (October 2007). Contingency Contracting Operations: Achieving Better 
Results [Power Point Slides]. MN3318 Contingency Contracting Course. Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California. 
13 Cory E. Yoder, CDR. (October 2007). Contingency Contracting Operations: Achieving Better 
Results [Power Point Slides]. 
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF ARMY CONTINGENCY 
CONTRACTING PROBLEMS 
In an April 2008 breakout session at the National Contract Management 
Association’s (NCMA) World Congress, Dr. Steven Kelman, Weatherhead Professor of 
Public Management, Harvard University commented on the present state of government 
contracting: “1102s are going through a tough time.”  He also described that with the 
current state of the contracting environment, the acquisition workforce is at risk of falling 
into a “death spiral.” Kelman describes this as a combination of insufficient numbers of 
contingency contracting professionals, who are faced with increasingly complex work 
requirements. This type of working environment raises error rates, and as a result, 
increases audits and management oversight.   
Workforce shortages in the federal acquisition community coupled with the 
increased tempo from wartime events has changed the manner in which the U.S. Army 
plans and executes expeditionary operations. Based on relevant publications, 
congressional hearings and Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, the Army 
contracting community has at least four key areas that must be addressed over the next 
few years; as they affect the Army’s ability to effectively and efficiently respond in 
contingency contracting situations. They are listed and discussed below: 
• A Changing War Environment; 
• Increased Contracting Workload and Complexity of Contract Actions; 
• Increased Responsibility of Acquisition Professionals; and, 
• A Declining Capability of the Acquisition Workforce. 
A. CHANGING WAR ENVIRONMENT 
 America is engaged in a war unlike any other in history. Army leaders indicate 
that the nation may continue to be engaged in an era of persistent conflict, characterized 
by protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors. The willingness 
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to use violence to achieve political and ideological ends is not new, but modern, 
networked terrorist cells pose new problems, particularly for a large, complex and 
hierarchical bureaucracy.14 As evidenced in OEF and OIF, the U.S. and other nations are 
combating non-state actors - Al Qaeda and the Taliban - who besides being stateless are 
often indistinguishable, and even protected by the local population; which is quite 
different from historical operations.  
Traditionally, most wars, especially those waged in the European tradition, 
have also had clear beginnings and endings. On a certain day hostilities 
were declared or initiated, and on another certain day one side agreed to 
stop fighting. But the line between war and peace was never as clear in the 
non-European world, and has been steadily blurring for the United States 
since the end of the Cold War in part because it is difficult to obtain 
conclusive military victories against irregular enemies who refuse to quit 
precisely because they cannot be decisively defeated. 15 
In addition to the changing nature of the threat, contractor support in U.S. military 
operations is becoming more essential to mission success then ever before. Government 
cuts, hiring freezes and acquisition reform in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in a 
considerably smaller number of civilian and military officials available to carry out 
mission requirements.  Reductions in the size and shape of the federal acquisition 
workforce have, by default, increased private sector service contracts.16  This and other 
elements of the changing war environment are discussed below. 
1. Global War on Terror: Fourth Generation War Concept 
The idea that the environment of war has changed is further supported by the 
Fourth Generation War Concept which states that, “…warfare has evolved through four 
generations: 1) the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) maneuver, and now 4) an 
evolved form of insurgency that employs all available networks- political, economic, 
                                                 
14 Headquarters; Department of the Army. (February 2008). Operations (Army Field Manual 3-0). 
Retrieved April 2008, from http://downloads.army.mil/fm3-0/FM3-0.pdf. 
15 Jeffery Record. (December 2003) Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (U.S. Army War College, 
Strategic Studies Institute), p. 5. 
16 Congressional Research Services Report for Congress (2007) Defense Contracting in Iraq: Issues 
and Options for Congress, p. 19. 
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social, military- to convince an opponent’s decision makers that their strategic goals are 
either unachievable or too costly.”17 The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks are 
characteristic of the Fourth Generation War phenomena.   
The GWOT is an evolved type of war not experienced by U.S. soldiers until Viet 
Cong insurgents blended with their population in the 1970s, blurring the face of the 
enemy.  As described by former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, “…the truth is, 
this will be a war like none other our nation has faced.”18  In the GWOT, no longer are 
nations fighting nations, but nations are now fighting non-nation terrorist organizations. 
In Fourth Generation War, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over 
the world, state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents 
such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia.  Almost everywhere, the state is losing. 19    
Our nation is now tasked with quickly adapting to this new type of war to maintain 
homeland defense.  
The Gansler report, (see Chapter IV), questions whether the Army has recognized 
the shifting challenges of a changed war environment.  
After looking at the entire landscape of acquisition issues in Kuwait, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, as the Commission has had the opportunity to do, it 
is evident that the problems experienced in Acquisition and Program 
Management in an Expeditionary Environment are not due to one 
particular problem nor an individual failure to perform, but rather because 
multiple Agencies and Departments have failed to fully recognize or 
comprehensively address the significance of the shifting challenges of the 
post-Cold-War environment.20  
                                                 
17 Antulio J. Echevarrria II. (2005). Fourth Generation War and Other Myths (U.S. Army War 
College Strategic Studies Institute), p. v. 
18 Donald H. Rumsfeld. (September 2001). A New Kind of War. The New York Times. Retrieved May 
2008 from http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=440. 
19 William S. Lind. (September-October 2004). Understanding the Fourth Generation of War. Military 
Review. Retrieved May 2008 from https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dod/nps37-010907-
03.pdf&code=817fa80b0a833c93a10515ee3560896d. 
20 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations (October 2007). Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting p. 
13. 
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Although it is evident that military operations as we know them today have changed since 
the end of the Cold War, it is questionable as to whether agencies have recognized the 
Fourth Generation War concept or something similar. 
2. Increased Reliance on Contractor Support on the Battlefield 
As mentioned earlier, government personnel cuts, hiring freezes and acquisition 
reform in the 1980s and 1990s reduced the number of contracting professionals. 
Contractor support on the battlefield has become an essential link to fulfilling OEF/OIF 
mission requirements. In an April 15th, 2008 presentation Steven Schooner, an Associate 
Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program at 
George Washington University Law School, stated that there are 180,000 contractors in 
Iraq, with a 1:1 ratio of contractors to troops.21 Throughout U.S. history, contractors have 
always been on the battlefield; their role in military operations increasing over time: 
The reliance on contractors grew unevenly: There was one civilian worker 
for every twenty soldiers in World War I, one for every seven in World 
War II, and one for every six soldiers in the Vietnam War.  The end of the 
Cold War saw a dramatic increase, however, as the American military 
downsized, contractors filled the gap, and by the first Gulf War defense 
contractors were edging their way on the battlefield, mostly to maintain 
weapon systems like M1, Abrams Tanks, and Patriot Missile batteries.22  
With such a dramatic increase in the number of contractors on the battlefield, the Army 
has recognized, and brought to the forefront, issues that have arisen by having such a 
dependence upon contractors support for what was once organic in nature to the Army.   
By many accounts, the crucial issue is often command and control.  Contractors 
are bound by contract legal terms, and contracting officers are the only personnel who 
can enter the government into a binding contractual relationship.  Although military 
commanders have authority over all military personnel within their Area of 
Responsibility (AOR), they do not have direct authority over any contract or associated 
                                                 
21 Steven Schooner. (15 April 2008). Too Dependent on Contractors? [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved 
from http://www.ncmahq.org/files/presentations/707.ppt. 
22 T. Christian Miller. (2006). Blood Money: Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq 
New York: Little, Brown and Company. p. 75. 
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contractor personnel. DoD Instruction 3020.41 describes the relationship between the 
contracting officer, defense contractor, and military commander as such:  
The contracting officer, or designee, is the liaison between the commander 
and the defense contractor for directing or controlling contractor 
performance because commanders have no direct contractual relationship 
with the defense contractor. However, the ranking military commander 
may, in emergency situations, (e.g., enemy or terrorist actions or natural 
disaster), direct contingency contractor personnel to take lawful action as 
long as those actions do not require them to assume inherently 
governmental responsibilities. 23 
For the military commander, this lack of authority over contractual arrangements can 
create real and perceived gaps in their command and control capabilities, leading to failed 
communication and loss of life concerns.  A break-down in communication may help 
explain the 2004 attack on Blackwater contractors by Iraqi militia members. 
Desperate and unable to communicate directly with military commanders, 
the eight Blackwater contractors instead called in help from Blackwater 
employees, he said. With approval from Mr. Bremer's staff, three 
Blackwater helicopters -- the same ones used to ferry Mr. Bremer around 
Iraq -- were dispatched to the Najaf battle to drop ammunition and retrieve 
a wounded marine.24    
Contractor support on the battlefield has become increasingly important to accomplishing 
the Army’s mission in the GWOT.  With this increased reliance, contractor surveillance 
becomes dually important to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer dollars.  
Increased surveillance and oversight requires better trained government personnel such as 
Contracting Officer’s Representatives.   
                                                 
23 Department of Defense. (October 2005). Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. 
Armed Forces (DoD Instruction 3020.41), p. 15. Retrieved June 2008 from 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302041p.pdf. 
24 David Barstow, Richard A. Oppel Jr., James Risen, & Eric Schmitt. (April 9, 2004). The Struggle 
For Iraq: The Contractors: Security Firm Says Its Workers Were Lured Into Iraqi Ambush. The New York 
Times. Retrieved June 2008 from 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE4DB1238F93AA35757C0A9629C8B63. 
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B. INCREASED WORKLOAD AND COMPLEXITY OF CONTRACTING 
ACTIONS 
Over the last two decades, the federal acquisition workforce has had to adapt to a 
significant reduction in its workforce, an increase to its workload, changes to 
procurement laws and regulations, and a need for its personnel to acquire new skill sets. 
For example, contracting officers and their specialists are now required to have a greater 
knowledge of the entire acquisition process to include market and industry conditions, 
technical details of the hardware and services they procure, and an understanding of the 
entire life cycle of an acquisition; all while maintaining an up to date knowledge of all 
procurement reform legislation and policy changes. Despite workforce shortages of 
approximately fifty percent between 1990 and 2001, the workload for the DoD 
acquisition community did not reduce proportionately; rather it increased by twelve 
percent.25  
To further exemplify the increase in workload, from FY90 through FY99, while 
the value of DoD procurement actions decreased from about $144.7 billion to about 
$139.8 billion, about three percent, the number of procurement actions increased from 
about 13.2 million to about 14.8 million, or twelve percent. The largest amount of work 
for contracting personnel are on actions over $100,000, which from FY 1990 to FY 1999 
increased about twenty-eight percent, from 97,948 actions to 125,692 actions.26 
In addition to an increase in the total number of contract actions completed per 
fiscal year,  federal acquisition policy changes and a mandatory focus towards the use of 
performance-based service contracting, has emphasized the need for highly trained and 
experienced contracting personnel in order to ensure the most efficient and effective use 
of taxpayer dollars. An unintended consequence of the hiring freezes in the 1990s was a 
dramatic reduction in the quantity and quality of federal acquisition personnel. “DoDs 
                                                 
25 Government Accountability Office. (2003). March 19 Hearing on Sourcing and Acquisition; 
Questions for Record (GO Report Number GAO-03-771R). Retrieved August 2008 from 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03771r.pdf. 
26 Department of Defense. (2000). DoD Acquisition Workforce Reduction Trends and Impacts (Report 
Number D-2000-088. Retrieved August 2008 from 
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/fy00/00088sum.htm. 
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civilian workforce shrank…between fiscal years 1989 and 2002, but DoD performed this 
downsizing without ensuring that remaining staff had the specific skills and competencies 
needed to accomplish future DoD missions.”27 To compound these challenges, seventy-
one percent of defense personnel are baby boomers and higher.28  With such a large 
number of experienced personnel likely considering retirement over the next five years, 
the federal government needs to address the imbalances in the skill sets of its remaining 
workforce and the potential loss of its experience base as its procurement specialists 
prepare to retire. 
According to the GAO, the federal acquisition community is also experiencing an 
increase in the complexity of contract actions. Complex actions require well-trained 
personnel and more contract surveillance and oversight. As a result of recent acquisition 
reform under the Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) and the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA), best value procurements have become the norm.  The 
procurement of services now accounts for about 60 percent of total procurement dollars 
spent and therefore have become a main focus of DoD officials.29  Rather than just a 
suggestion, it is now a mandatory requirement to utilize performance based service 
contracting to the maximum extent practicable. In performance based service contracting, 
rather than being told how to perform a specific requirement, contractors are informed of 
the intended outcome of the government’s requirement. This gives contractors the 
flexibility to provide new and innovative approaches to meet the government’s needs. 
Measurable performance standards are now used to evaluate contractor performance. 
Additionally, appropriate incentives are structured to motivate adequate performance, 
while price or fee reductions are utilized in situations of nonperformance.  
                                                 
27 U.S. Government Accountability Office. (September 2006). Rebuilding Iraq: Continued Progress 
Requires Overcoming Contract Management Challenges ( GAO Report No. 06-1130T); p 8. 
28 Frank Anderson. (April 14, 2008). Proceedings from the National Contract Management 
Association’s (NCMA) World Congress General Session Panel: Contract Management Workforce: Is 
Quality Enough?;  Cincinnati, OH. 
29 U.S. Government Accountability Office. (February 2008). Federal Acquisition: Oversight Plan 
Needed to Help Implement Acquisition Advisory Panel’s Recommendations (GAO Report No. 08-515T); p. 
1.  
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Use of performance based contracting is a highly involved process requiring 
special training for contracting and acquisition personnel, as well as, for DoD contractors.  
Value-based procurement is better for both the American taxpayer and the 
American Warfighter. However, experience shows that it also requires 
more and higher quality contracting and program management 
personnel.30  
Performance-based service contracting also brings the need for more surveillance and 
oversight so the Army is able to identify and correct inadequate contractor performance.  
Furthermore, oversight is even more imperative in expeditionary operations as mission 
success is dependent upon the timely delivery of goods and services purchased.   
Therefore, the Army must ensure that surveillance personnel in theatre are properly 
trained on how to evaluate contractor performance and that they understand the 
importance that their position holds in contract performance. 
C. INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY OF ACQUISITION PROFESSIONALS 
As a Contracting Officer, the primary objective is to deliver the best value 
products and services to the customer to fulfill public policy objectives. As stated in the 
FAR 1.102-1(b), all participants in the system are responsible for making acquisition 
decisions that deliver the best value product or service to the customer. The guiding 
principles behind the preference to obtain best value that we see in the FAR today have 
come out of acquisition reform in the 1980s and 90s. According to a Research and 
Development (RAND) Corporation study done in 2005, seventy-one acquisition reform 
initiatives were introduced during the 1990s.31  
In the 1980s, reform efforts focused on reducing “waste, fraud, and abuse” 
in the system. In the 1990s, the emphasis shifted toward trying to make the 
acquisition process more responsive, effective, and efficient—i.e., “faster, 
better, cheaper.32 
                                                 
30United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (October 2007), p. 15-16. 
31 The RAND Corporation. (2005). Reexamining Acquisition Reform: Are We There Yet?  Santa 
Monica, CA: Hanks, C.H., Axelband, E.I., Lindsay, S., Malik, R.M., & Steele, B.D. p. 12. 
32 The RAND Corporation. (2005). Reexamining Acquisition Reform: Are We There Yet?  Santa 
Monica, CA: Hanks, C.H., Axelband, E.I., Lindsay, S., Malik, R.M., & Steele, B.D. p. 1. 
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A result of these acquisition reform initiatives is increased responsibility for Contracting 
Officers, whose role as a business advisor is one that requires many different types of 
knowledge, skills and abilities. Contracting Officers are required to delegate certain areas 
of responsibility within the extent of their authority. In the Army, Contracting Officers 
are also supervisors who are required to be knowledgeable, and make quick decisions that 
provide best value products and services to the government.  With workforce shortages, 
lack of training and changes in acquisition policy and regulation, Contracting Officers are 
experiencing more increased responsibility than ever before.   
D. DECLINING CAPABILITY OF THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE 
Per the Gansler report, the number of government civilians and senior military 
officers in contracting positions has declined precipitously creating a combination 
reflective of the “perfect storm” in Army contracting.33 With much of the acquisition 
workforce at or near retirement age, there has been an influx of new contracting 
personnel.    As a result, a complex overseas environment combined with workforce 
shortages and inadequate training translates into declining capability  Ensuring that best 
value products and services are provided in a timely  manner is an elusive goal of the 
Army and one that it does not take lightly.    
E. SUMMARY 
Based upon review and analysis of publications, congressional hearings and 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, the Army contracting community has 
at least four key areas that must be addressed over the next few years, as they affect the 
Army’s ability to efficiently and effectively respond in contingency contracting situations 
The following pertain: a changing war environment, increased workload and complexity 
of contracting actions, increased responsibility of acquisition professionals, and declining 
capability of the acquisition workforce. The next chapter summarizes aspects of the 
Gansler report, including substantial problems identified in Army contingency 
contracting.   
                                                 
33 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
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IV. GANSLER COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 
In 2007, the Army established an Independent Commission on Army Acquisition 
and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations at the request of the Secretary of 
the Army, Mr. Peter Geren.  The resulting report from the Commission entitled, “Urgent 
Reform Required:  Army Expeditionary Contracting,” was issued on 31 October 2007 
and is named after the Commission’s chairman, Dr. Jacques Gansler, former Under 
Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics). The Commission heard testimony from 
more than 100 individuals who are well experienced in the challenges of Army 
acquisition in expeditionary operations, primarily in Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The 
information obtained from the testimony identified several acquisition failures in Army 
Expeditionary Operations, calling for an urgent systematic fix of Army Contracting.34   
The report stated, Four Key Improvements Are Needed:   
1. Increase the Stature, Quantity, and Career Development of the Army’s 
Contracting Personnel, Military and Civilian (Especially for Expeditionary 
Operations); 
2. Restructure Organization and Restore Responsibility to Facilitate Contracting 
and Contract Management in Expeditionary and CONUS Operations; 
3. Provide Training and Tools for Overall Contracting Activities in 
Expeditionary Operations; 
4. Obtain Legislative, Regulatory, and Policy Assistance to Enable Contracting 
Effectiveness in Expeditionary Operations.35 
Prompting the launch of the newly implemented Army Contracting Command in 
March 2008, the Gansler report is intended to be instrumental in reforming the way that 
the Army conducts expeditionary contracting operations.  In a November 2007 testimony, 
                                                 
34 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations (October 2007). p. 1. 
35 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations (October 2007), p. 5. 
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the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Pete Geren commented that, “Dr. Gansler's report offered 
a very blunt and comprehensive assessment that I asked for and that the Army needed, 
and he outlined a plan for the way ahead after citing structural weaknesses and 
organizational shortcomings in the U.S. Army's acquisition and contracting system used 
to support expeditionary operations.”36 The most notable characteristic of the Gansler 
commission testimony is a nearly unanimous perception of the current problems, their 
gravity, and the urgent need for reform.37 Army leaders are now tasked with the 
challenge of implementing the recommendations identified in the Gansler report; which 
calls for substantial reform of expeditionary operations.  
A. INCREASE MILITARY/CIVILIAN CONTRACTING WORKFORCE 
The Gansler Commission found that, “the expeditionary environment requires 
more trained and experienced military officers and non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs).”38 Acquisition personnel have been reduced partly from hiring freezes in the 
1990s which shrank the workforce by about 38 percent between 1989 and 2002. 39 This 
downsizing appears to have resulted in a compromised capability to accomplish future 
DoD missions. Coupled with the contextual realities of a long-war and retiring baby 
boomers, the 1102 job series is in crisis, e.g., 71 percent of defense personnel are baby 
boomers and older.40  A persistent increase in contracting action workload over the past 
                                                 
36 Statement by the Honorable Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army. (November 2007). Testimony 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, United States Senate, First Session, 110th Congress on the 
Army’s Strategic Imperatives. (Record Version). Retrieved June 2008 from http://www.army.mil/-
speeches/2007/11/15/6143-secretary-of-the-army-statement-on-the-armys-strategic-imperatives/. 
37 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (October 2007), p. 2. 
38 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (October 2007), p. 2. 
39 U.S. Government Accountability Office. (September 2006). Rebuilding Iraq: Continued Progress 
Requires Overcoming Contract Management Challenges (GAO Report No. 06-1130T); p 8. 
40 Frank Anderson. (April 14, 2008). Proceedings from the National Contract Management 
Association’s (NCMA) World Congress General Session Panel: Contract Management Workforce: Is 
Quality Enough?;  Cincinnati, OH. 
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years exacerbates the ability to perform. The Army is doing more work with less people, 
and workload has increased by 600 percent; a seven fold increase since the 1990s.41  
The Gansler report claims there are 279 Army military contracting career 
personnel, compared to 5,563 civilian personnel. Table 1 below, shows numbers of 
procurement actions and associated dollars by Service. It also includes the numbers and 
types of contracting personnel; both military and civilian, in the Army, Air Force, and 
Navy. 
 
 Army Air Force Navy 
Procurement $ $100.6B $180B $73.7B 
Procurement Actions 398,748 61,000 282,910 
Total Contracting personnel 5,821 6,878 5,017 
Military Contracting personnel 279 2,136 1,272 
Civilian Contracting personnel 5,563 4,792 3,435 
Military Reserve/National Guard 195 510 Unavailable 
Table 1.   Army, Air Force, Navy -Civilian to Military Contracting Personnel 
Ratio42 
 
 Compared to the Air Force and Navy, the Army is particularly lacking in military 
contracting personnel.  Of particular note is that civilians deploy to a theatre of operations 
on a volunteer basis. Unlike the military, it is not mandatory for contracting civilians to 
deploy into a theatre of operations.   
There is no lack of consensus that there are insufficient government contracting 
personnel - civilian and military – and gaps in needed training. With the growth in service 
contracting, the increase in the number of complex, billion dollar contracts, and the 
                                                 
41 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (October 2007), p. 13. 
42United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations [Table 9]. (October 2007).  The Army Civilian-to-Military Contracting Personnel 
Ratio is Insufficient to Sustain Expeditionary Contracting Operations.  
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decline in the number of federal acquisition workforce employees, some assert that there 
are not enough DoD contracting officials, onsite in Iraq, who are available to manage the 
complexities of the new acquisition programs, or oversee private sector contractors.43 
To address the need for an increase in military and civilian personnel, the Gansler 
Report outlined recommendations, including the following:  
• A request to authorize ten additional General Officers for Army 
contracting positions; 
• Maintain the stature of the existing civilian Senior Executive Service 
(SES) positions, and  add one new deputy; 
• Increase military and civilian contracting personnel by 25 percent;  
• Introduce an Army Military Operational Specialty (MOS) in the 
contracting career field much earlier into a soldiers career ; 
• Capture and utilize lessons learned;  
• Ensure that expeditionary operations are not a first assignment; 
• Adequately fund career planning programs, education and training, 
promotion potential, and contracting internships; 
• Establish a way for civilians to pre-volunteer for expeditionary 
operations; 
• Require a rewrite of personnel directives regarding civilians in military 
operations; and 
• Establish a separate and centrally managed contracting corps for Army 
military and civilian contracting personnel.44 
                                                 
43 Congressional Research Services Report for Congress. (2007). Defense Contracting in Iraq: Issues 
and Options for Congress. p. 19. 
44 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (October 2007), p. 47-50. 
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B. RESTRUCTURE THE ARMY ORGANIZATION 
The second key improvement recommended by the Gansler Commission is to 
“restructure organization and restore responsibility to facilitate contracting and contract 
management in expeditionary and CONUS operations.”45 Regaining command and 
control capability would be part of any restructuring. The Commission recommended that 
a single Army Contracting Command (ACC), reporting to the Commanding General of 
the Army Materiel Command, be established and charged with developing a relevant and 
ready expeditionary contracting capability. The new commander of the ACC would 
provide a single focal point for status and readiness of the Army-wide contracting 
workforce.46  
The need to restructure is driven by several factors. For example, the report found 
there is a lack of General Officers in the contracting profession, stating that in the 1990s 
there were nine General Officer positions for contract professionals, (five Army slots and 
four joint slots at the one and two star levels).47  Today, there are no such slots.  It is 
evident that the Army needs General Officers familiar with contingency contracting. The 
report identifies additional dysfunction, noting that the, “Operational Army does not yet 
recognize the impact of contracting and contractors in expeditionary operations and on 
mission success”.48 
To address the need to restructure the Army, the Gansler Commission outlined 
recommendations including: 
• Establish a Deputy for Contracting as a Major General billet reporting to 
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology (ASA AL&T);  
                                                 
45 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (October 2007), p. 5. 
46 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (October 2007), p. 11. 
47 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (October 2007), p. 32. 
48 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations.  (October 2007), p. 32-33. 
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• Create an Army Contracting Command (ACC) led by a Major General;  
• Launch an Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) led by a Brigadier 
General;    
• Structure the ECC to be comprised of  military contracting support 
brigades;  
• Establish an Installation Contracting Command (ICC) under ACC; 
• Allow the ACC to have direct authority for all Army contracting resources 
which will enable a surge capability to resource the staffing needs of the 
ECC; and  
• Create an Integrated Expeditionary Command (IEC) in theater for each 
military operation.49 
C. INCREASE TRAINING AND CONTRACTING RESOURCES 
The third key improvement recommendation stems from the Gansler 
Commission’s determination that there are an insufficient number of civilian/military 
contracting personnel, as well as, insufficient training to accomplish required tasks. 
Having inadequately trained personnel is a reasonable predictor leading to fraud, waste, 
and abuse.  According to Secretary of the Army Peter Geren: 
As of November 6th 2007, the US Army Criminal Investigation Command 
is conducting 80 investigations relating to contract fraud in Iraq, Kuwait, 
and Afghanistan. While the cases vary in severity and complexity, most 
involve bribery. There are confirmed bribes in excess of $15 million. 
Twenty-three US citizens, to include 18 government employees, both 
military and civilian, have been charged or indicted in federal court. 
Contracts valued at more than $6 billion are affected. 50 
                                                 
49 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (October 2007), p. 51-55. 
50 Statement by the Honorable Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army. (November 2007). Testimony 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, United States Senate, First Session, 110th Congress on the 
Army’s Strategic Imperatives. (Record Version). Retrieved June 2008 from http://www.army.mil/-
speeches/2007/11/15/6143-secretary-of-the-army-statement-on-the-armys-strategic-imperatives/. 
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Sending improperly or insufficiently trained personnel into a theatre of operations with 
little or no experience is a recipe for disaster when it comes to accountability, particularly 
in the pressure cooker of an overseas war context.  Additionally, the report found that 
even experienced personnel needed time to adjust to contingency contracting procedures, 
once deployed.   
The overall acquisition workforce (especially military) is weapons-
systems oriented. Because of this, and as well prepared as they are, the 
Commission learned that even the Air Force’s deployed Contracting 
Officers (COs) currently need about six weeks to transition their 
“mindset” from a CONUS peacetime perspective to one that can respond 
to the accelerated operational tempo demands of expeditionary 
operations.51 
This becomes a problem in expeditionary operations when contracting personnel are 
continuously rotated through a contingency, oftentimes deploying for time periods of 
only 180 days.52 
To address the need for increased training for military and civilian contracting 
professionals the Gansler report outlined the following: 
• Train all Army military leaders (officers and non-commissioned officers) on 
the important role of contracting in expeditionary operations; 
• Develop and field contract tools needed for the expeditionary forces, 
including sample contracts, statements of work, etc.; 
• Focus the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) to train the civilian and 
military contracting workforce for expeditionary operations; and, 
• Provide Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) with necessary training 
prior to military operations.53 
                                                 
51 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (October 2007), p. 26. 
52 Department of the Army. (February 2008). Personnel Policy for Guidance in Contingency 
Operations in Support of GWOT. Retrieved September 2008 from 
http://www.armyg1.army.mil/militarypersonnel/ppg/PPG.pdf#Chapter3. 
53 United States Army. Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (October 2007), p. 55-56. 
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D. REFORM LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY ASSITANCE TO BE 
MORE EFFECTIVE IN CONTINGENCY ENVIRONMENTS 
DoD contracting in peacetime operations is governed by a strict set of regulations, 
rules, and guidelines. The FAR, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS), and the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS), outline 
procedures for contracting officers to use in order to get the best value products and 
services. However, in expeditionary operations, best value is not always the ultimate 
objective; oftentimes it is accomplishing mission objectives and saving lives.  The strict 
regulations are in place to provide a best value result to the taxpayer, but they do not 
always apply when rapid response is needed and loss of life is a possibility.   
The final recommendation of the Gansler Commission calls for legislative reform 
and regulatory assistance to be more effective in contingency environments. The report 
outlined the following:  
• The need for legislative changes for expeditionary operations such as 
increasing the contracting workforce in the Army by 400 military members  
and 1,000 civilian members; 
• The need for incentives for civilian expeditionary contracting personnel to pre 
volunteer for deployments; 
• Eliminate the pay cap for civilians in support of expeditionary operations; 
• Establish a tax-free status for civilians deployed in support of OCONUS 
expeditionary operations;  
• Implement life insurance and long-term medical coverage for civilians 
deployed in support of expeditionary operations;  
• The need for legislation to enable a contingency operations Defense transfer 
fund with “color of money” or fiscal year limitations;  
• The need for legislation that allows Contracting Officers to waive contractual 
requirements, such as, small business standards  and the Buy American Act, to 
allow for rapid local buying if required in contingencies; and, 
• Regulatory changes to include an expeditionary contracting manual.54 
                                                 
54 United States Army. (October 2007). Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations; p. 56-58. 
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter captured the main findings in the Gansler report, including four 
recommendations to improve Army expeditionary contracting:  the need to increase the 
military and civilian contracting workforce, the need to restructure the Army contracting 
workforce, the need to increase training and contracting resources, and the need to reform 
legislative and regulatory assistance to be more effective in contingency environments.   
Chapter V analyzes the Army’s formal response, current initiatives and actions taken to 
implement these recommendations. Chapter VI analyzes survey and interview results and 
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V. ARMY RESPONSE TO GANSLER COMMISSION REPORT 
When asked to comment on the role of the Army Contracting Campaign Plan in 
implementing the Gansler report recommendations, the Executive Director of the newly 
launched Army Contracting Command (ACC), Mr. Jeffery Parsons responded, “I think 
we’ve come a long way.”55 However, just how far has the Army come in implementing 
these recommendations? Specifically, to what extent have the applicable Gansler 
Commission recommendations been formally acknowledged by Army leadership?  The 
focus of this chapter is to briefly analyze the status and remaining impediments 
associated with the implementation of the recommended improvements.   
A. INCREASE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CONTRACTING WORKFORCE 
The Army has taken steps towards achieving the first Gansler recommendation by 
increasing the size of its workforce. In a testimony before the Subcommittee on Defense, 
Committee on Appropriations, and the House of Representatives, Mr. David M. Walker, 
former Comptroller General of the United States, stated that the Army has plans to 
“…increase its contracting workforce by approximately 400 military personnel and 1,000 
civilian personnel.”56 In July 2008, the Army approved a concept plan detailing a 
recruitment strategy that will increase its workforce over the next few years.57 In an 
attempt to attract new talent and to be able to hire personnel in an expedited manner, the 
command has requested the approval of direct hire authority.58 The next step for the 
Army is to obtain congressional approval on funding for the additional employees. 
                                                 
55 Jeffery Parsons. Executive Director of the Army Contracting Command. Personal Interview. May 
12, 2008. 
56 U.S. Government Accountability Office. (April 2008). Defense Acquisitions; DoD’s Increased 
Reliance on Service Contractors Exacerbates Long- Standing Challenge (GAO Report No. 08-08-621T), 
p.9. Retrieved July 2008 from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08621t.pdf. 
57 United States Army Material Command (AMC). (July 2008). Commanding General Town Hall 
Meeting with the Acquisition Centers [Power Point Slides]. 
58 Elise Castelli. (July 29, 2008). Army gets go-ahead to create 1,400 contracting officer positions. 
Federal Times.com.  Retrieved August 2008 from http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=3648689.  
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The GWOT exposed major flaws in the Army’s contracting abilities, especially 
when the purchasing was done in OCONUS locations. As military acquisitions have 
become more complex, the contracting profession has been brought to the forefront as a 
specialized occupation; one that is in dire need for experienced personnel. The roles and 
responsibilities of an acquisition professional have increased as they are now expected to 
have an understanding of the entire acquisition life cycle. An overworked and 
understaffed workforce felt the pressures of the demanding requirements created by the 
GWOT. Bad business decisions and deals were made, and procurement fraud cases were 
exposed. Acknowledging that there may be no way to completely eliminate waste, fraud, 
and abuse, by increasing its number of military and civilian contracting professionals, the 
Army response is positive, in that more and better trained personnel will reduce workload 
pressure, thereby reducing future liabilities. 
In addition to increasing the acquisition workforce, it was also recommended that 
the DoD create additional General Officer billets to oversee purchasing and contractor 
performance. Five of these General Officer positions were requested for the Army, and 
would report directly to the Secretary of the Army. This is an important change that the 
Army needs to make in order to return to basic organizational and Army leadership 
principles as suggested by the Gansler commission. By having generals in top contracting 
positions, it will not only emphasize the importance of acquisition and contracting to 
other military members, but it will also help with retention and recruitment efforts by 
showing young soldiers that contracting is a promising career path. “If a contracting 
person has to say to a general that they have to follow the rules, it’s easier if you have 
your own general who will back you up.”59 Initially met with resistance, as it was 
believed the Army had enough general officers, the White House approved the creation 
of the additional billets in July 2008.60 These billets, once operating as recommended, 
                                                 
59Richard Lardner. (June 23, 2008). White House Blocking Army’s Plan to Overhaul Contracting 
System. The Huffington Post. Retrieved August 2008 from 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/06/23/white-house-blocking-army_n_108641.html. 
60 Richard Lardner.  (July, 02, 2008). White House does an about-face, OKs Army bid for more 




will reinforce a needed new direction for thousands of acquisition employees, elevate the 
role and criticality of contingency contracting, and provide career paths for many future 
Army officers.  
Also in this section, the Gansler commission mentioned that in increasing the 
military and civilian workforce, it is also necessary for the Army to address lessons 
learned. The researchers have found that the Army has responded to the Gansler 
Commission’s suggestion to capture and utilize lessons learned.  Specifically, the Army 
is formally interviewing units as they return from theater to capture “expeditionary 
contracting” lessons learned and incorporating the findings into doctrine, training guides, 
and user handbooks.61 
B. RESTRUCTURE THE ARMY ORGANIZATION 
One of the first actions that the Army took in implementing the Gansler report 
recommendations was the creation and launch of the Army Contracting Command (ACC) 
on March 14, 2008.  The ACC realigns several subordinate contracting commands into 
one organization which will report directly to the Army Material Command. The new 
command led by a two-star general is intended to provide a more centralized structure for 
planning, training, and responding to worldwide contingency operations. Parsons believes 
this design will improve Army command and control in future military operations.  
To prepare for the reorganization and transfer of missions, one thing personnel 
will notice is a name change for all acquisition centers and the Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) that will now be subordinate to the ACC. On October 
1st, 2008, the following commands will officially change their names as follows:  
 
Former Name:   New Name:  
 
LOGCAP   Executive Directorate for LOGCAP 
 
AMCOM   AMCOM Contracting Center  
 
                                                 
61 U.S. Army Contracting Command. Parsons, Jeffrey. (April 2008). Statement before the Committee 
on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, p. 5-6. 
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RDECOM   RDECOM Contracting Center 
 
TACOM   TACOM Contracting Center 
 
CECOM   CECOM Contracting Center 
 
ASC    Rock Island Contracting Center 
 
JM&L     JM&L Contracting Center62 
 
In addition to the creation of the Army Contracting Command, the Gansler 
Commission also recommended the creation of two subordinate one-star level 
commands; an Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) and an Installation 
Contracting Command (ICC). On June 6th, 2008, the Army welcomed its first brigade 
change of command since the establishment of the ACC. This change of command was 
significant as it marked “…the end of the 408th's alignment under Army Sustainment 
Command and its new role as a subordinate element of the U.S. Army Expeditionary 
Contracting Command, under ACC.”63  As the Army moves forward and continues to 
strengthen alignment of commands reporting to the ECC and the ICC, the Army is 
reinforcing to the world that it understands the importance that contracting plays in 
mission success and that it should not be considered something that is done on the side.   
Figure 1 below presented at an AMC town hall meeting in July of 2008 details the 
proposed structure of the newly launched ACC: 
                                                 
62 U.S. Army CECOM Life Cycle Management Command (CECOM LCMC). (August 2008). Internal 
Acquisition Center Policy (Policy Alert Number 45-08, subject: Name for Acquisition Centers to be 
‘Contracting Centers). 
63 Jim Hinnant. (401st Army Field Support Brigade).(June 6, 2008). Expeditionary Contracting 
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• Warren Acq. Center
• Redstone Arsenal Acq. Center
• Aberdeen Proving Ground Acq. Center
• Rock Island Arsenal Acq. Center
• Fort Monmouth Acq. Center
• Scott AFB Acq. Center
• Picatinny Arsenal Acq. Center
• OPM – SANG Acq. Mgt. Division
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Figure 1.   Army Contracting Command Proposed Structure 64 
General Benjamin Griffin said the stand-up of the ACC was a “…historic event, not 
because it was a new command but because the Army was demonstrating to OSD 
leadership, Congress, and the American taxpayer that Army leadership was serious in 
taking steps to regain confidence in Army contracting and ensuring that it becomes one of 
the Army's core competencies.”65  The ACC and its subordinate commands will reach 
initial operational capability on October 1, 2008, and full operational capability on 
October 1, 2009.66 
                                                 
64 United States Army Material Command. (July 14, 2008). Commanding General Town Hall Meeting 
with the Acquisition Centers [Power Point Slide 5]. 
65 J.D. Leipold. (March 14, 2008). Army Stands Up Contracting Command. Army Knowledge Online. 
Retrieved July 2008 from http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/03/14/7931-army-stands-up-contracting-
command/. 
66 United States Army Material Command. (July 14, 2008). AMC Commanding General Town Hall 
with the Acquisition Centers [Power Point Slide 9]. 
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C. INCREASE TRAINING AND CONTRACTING RESOURCES IN 
EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS 
The Army is making progress toward implementing the third recommendation to 
provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in expeditionary operations. 
One tool that the Army is developing, with the assistance of the Defense Acquisition 
University, is a focused expeditionary contracting training program that will provide an 
in depth look at contracting in an OCONUS situation. Another training opportunity that 
the Army is looking into is ways to improve upon the contingency contracting training 
currently provided at its Combined Training Centers. It has expanded the Battle 
Command Training Program mission to include acquisition professionals to train brigade, 
division and corps level military members on their roles in contingency contracting.67 As 
many new civilian and military members entering the contracting career field have little 
to no experience upon entry, it will be a challenge to continually train a workforce that is 
behind the curve in a long war. The sustained will of a critical mass of Army senior 
executives will be needed alongside sustained resources for basic and advanced 
(overseas) acquisition and contract training operating in CONUS and OCONUS 
environments. Regarding the Army’s ability to have an organized structure where 
individuals deploying are properly trained, Mr. Parsons provided the following, “The 
Army is making good progress, but this takes time.”68 
The Army has also instituted new policies regarding minimum training 
requirements for Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs). The purpose of the revised 
requirements is to ensure that the Army has properly trained personnel in theater to 
monitor contractor performance. An example of the new requirement is the mandatory 
completion of the Defense Acquisition University’s online “COR with a Mission Focus” 
course prior to COR appointment. Additionally, Mr. Parsons emphasized that he will not 
deploy staff to Iraq or Afghanistan without at least a year of experience. He has stated, 
                                                 
67 U.S. Army Contracting Command. Parsons, Jeffrey. (April 2008). Statement before the Committee 
on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
68 Jeffrey Parsons. Personal Interview, May 12, 2008.  
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“That’s not where you want to send someone to learn the basics.”69  In fact, the Army has 
instituted a policy stating that military members will not deploy during their first year in 
contracting.70  
One initiative that The CECOM LCMC Acquisition Center has implemented to 
ensure that CORs and contracting professionals understand their roles and responsibilities 
in contract management oversight is the creation of the CECOM LCMC Contracting 
Officer’s Representative Management System Handbook, which is continuously updated 
to reflect the most current COR policies and regulations of the DoD and Army. The 
CECOM LCMC Acquisition Center has also deployed a Contracting Officer’s 
Representative Management System website, which will allow the tracking and 
management of COR nominees, existing CORs, and COR contract management.71  
Another initiative that has been completed is the creation and publication of a 
Joint Contingency Contracting Officer handbook; which was distributed through DoD 
channels starting in February 2008. The Handbook is composed of two separate pieces; 
a hard copy book and a supporting DVD. The two piece reference is intended to be used, 
1) to train at a home station, 2) as a reference while deployed, and 3) for training while 
deployed, if required. The handbook materials are constantly undergoing review and the 
FY08-01 version will be updated in FY-09.72  
The Army is also currently developing a Virtual Contracting Enterprise that will 
provide an electronic means for acquisition professionals “…to receive web-based tools 
to enable visibility and analysis of the full scope of the entire contracting mission.” Other 
improvements to training and contracting doctrine that the Army is currently working 
include; 1) Working with the Joint community on the final draft of Joint Publication 4-10, 
                                                 
69 Elise Castelli. (July 29, 2008). Army gets go-ahead to create 1,400 contracting officer positions. 
Federal Times.com. Retrieved August 2008 from http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=3648689. 
70 U.S. Army Contracting Command. Parsons, Jeffrey. (April 2008). Statement before the Committee 
on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, p. .5-6. 
71 CECOM LCMC Acquisition Center. (May 2008). Internal Policy Alert (Policy Alert Number 26-
08, subject: “Revised Contracting Officer Representative (COR) Management System Handbook dated 19 
May 2008).” 
72 Joint Contingency Contracting Officer Handbook. Accessible from the following website; 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=168819&lang=en-US. 
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Operational Contract Support; 2) Developing Field Manual 4-10, Commanders Guide to 
Contracting and Contractor Management, and Field Manual Interim 4-93.42,  Contract 
Support Brigade; 3) Re-examining training curriculum for all newly accessed acquisition 
officers and civilians; and, 4) Re-examining the accession point for contracting officers 
and NCOs into the Army Acquisition Corps.73  
D. REFORM LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY ASSITANCE TO BE 
MORE EFFECTIVE IN CONTINGENCY ENVIRONMENTS 
  The Army has also taken steps forward in the implementation of the fourth 
recommendation regarding reform of legislative and regulatory policies for expeditionary 
operations. Legislative changes and funding requests have been set in motion to authorize 
and hire the additional 400 military and 1,000 civilian contracting personnel as 
recommended by the Gansler commission. While the entire process will take several 
years to complete, the ACC is committed to increasing the size of its workforce to ensure 
that it can adequately staff and train its contracting personnel to make contracting a core 
competency in the Army and to regain the trust of the American taxpayer.   
Mr. Jeff Parsons provided insight into the fact that legislative proposals are 
currently in place to provide additional incentives for civilians who deploy into a theatre 
of operations. Parsons also informed the researchers that other policy changes are in place 
regarding small business regulations and the Berry Amendment.74 A current legislative 
focus of the ACC is on the development of ACC command-wide policies and procedures, 
to allow consistent implementation of regulation. These new policies and procedures are 
scheduled to take effect on March 1, 2009.75   
Additionally, the DoD has been working other commission recommendations in 
regard to the creation of an Armed Forces Civilian Service Medal, incentives for civilians 
to deploy, and regulatory changes for expeditionary operations. To date, the DoD has 
                                                 
73 U.S. Army Contracting Command. Parsons, Jeffrey. (April 2008). Statement before the Committee 
on Armed Services, US House of Representatives on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, p. 5-6. 
74 Jeffrey Parsons. Personal Interview, May 12, 2008. 
75 United States Army Material Command. (July 14, 2008). AMC Commanding General Town Hall 
with the Acquisition Centers [Power Point Slide 9]. 
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created two new medals for civilian contributions to the Global War on Terror.76  The 
Department is also working to address the Commission’s recommendations to support 
and facilitate civilian contracting personnel participation in expeditionary operations, and 
to pre-position waivers to allow for rapid, local buying in support of expeditionary 
operations.77  
E. SUMMARY 
The Army’s implementation of the Gansler Commission’s recommendations will 
not be a one time fix; rather it will be a continuous process that will require constant 
oversight, management, and support from DoD and Army leaders. The goal in 
implementing these recommendations is to hasten adaptation to a changing world. More 
appropriate organizational structures, more and better trained contracting specialists, and 
emerging best practice tools are positive interventions designed to fundamentally change 
and boost Army expeditionary operations capability and performance in conflict zones 
worldwide. This chapter reviewed many of the changes that the Army has already begun 
to make regarding the Gansler recommendations. While this study focused on major 
aspects of the Army’s implementation of the Gansler recommendations, the process is 
still unfolding and emerging. Our macro conclusion is that the Army has taken the report 
seriously and acknowledged the need for system-wide changes, including undertaking 
structural changes, as well as, increases in personnel, improved training designs, and 
better regulation.    
                                                 
76 John J. Young. (April 2008). Testimony of John J. Young Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology & Logistics) Before the United States House Committee on Armed Services, p. 13-14. 
77 John J. Young. (April 2008). Testimony of John J. Young Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
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VI. SURVEY/INTERVIEW RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
The GWOT has changed the manner in which the Army fulfils its contracting 
needs. Expeditionary Operations have placed extraordinary demands upon the DoD 
contracting system and its workforce.  Researcher developed surveys (Appendix A), were 
distributed amongst currently deployed contract professionals, both from the military and 
civilian side in order to gain a ‘boots on the ground’ insight into the role of a deployed 
contracting professional. The purpose of the survey was to evaluate and asses the Army’s 
procedures for contingency contracting and to evaluate the roles, procedures, principles 
and emerging issues facing contingency contracting professionals in respect to their 
responsibilities in expeditionary operations. The results of the surveys were compared 
against the recommendations made by the Gansler Commission (Chapter IV), as well as, 
to the actions taken by the Army for implementation of the recommendations (Chapter 
V). Analysis has determined that in many respects, the Army is reacting positively and 
making the necessary changes to its organizational structure and its policies in order to 
meet the needs of its deployed workforce. There are, however, some areas in which the 
deployed workforce feels additional changes need to be made to create a more effective 
and efficient expeditionary contracting workforce. The details and analysis of the surveys 
are discussed below. 
A. SURVEY DEVELOPMENT 
To assess Army procedures for contingency contracting and to evaluate changing 
roles and emerging issues facing expeditionary contracting professionals, this study 
analyzed Gansler report concerns and perceptions of civilian and military contingency 
contracting professionals. A survey was used to obtain information concerning the 
preparation and training of acquisition professionals deployed in contingency operations. 
Information was also obtained to assess prevention measures designed to prevent 
problems discussed in Chapter III.  
The survey obtained the following basic background information from all 
participants: job title while deployed, military member or a civilian, years of contracting 
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experience, and types of contract vehicles utilized in theater. This section also obtained 
dollar value(s) of acquisitions completed in a contingency environment, and identified 
particular types of contract vehicles, and item/services being procured in the contingency 
environment.   
Additionally, the survey addressed training opportunities and certification levels 
held by those deployed. Survey responses determined the level of contracting 
certification held prior to being deployed and if pre-deployment training courses were 
available. If pre-deployment training courses were made available, respondents were 
asked to identify courses offered, and to assess training effectiveness prior to 
deployments. Survey responses helped determine if participating, deployed specialists 
perceived that they were adequately trained to complete contract functions in an 
expeditionary environment.  
The third area of concern uncovered if contracting resources and tools, such as the 
FAR/DFAR, sample contracts, templates, and on the job training are available once a 
contract specialist/contracting officer is in theater. If they were noted as being available, 
questions further determined perceived effectiveness of the tools provided. The goal of 
this section of the survey was to determine the types of resources available in theater. 
The final area of the survey obtained respondents perceptions on how future 
contingency contracting operations could be improved, e.g., primarily through improved 
processes and procedures. Respondent responses were compared alongside Gansler 
Commission recommendations and current Army implementation initiatives.  
The surveys were designed to provide a unique ‘boots on the ground’ insight, 
allowing researchers to analyze what deployed contracting professionals in the field said 
they need to support overseas contracting functions. The background information was 
used to conduct comparisons by experience level, training received, and organization 
supported (civilian and military).  
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B. SURVEY RESPONSES AND ANALYSIS 
A copy of the survey can be found at Appendix A of this document.  The survey 
was distributed during the period of June 3, 2008 through August 27, 2008, to currently 
and previously deployed contracting professionals. 
There were a total of 21 responses to the survey. Table 2 provides a graphical 
break out of the branches of the military that took part in this survey and the quantity of 
responses received: 
DOD SERVICE MILITARY CIVILIAN TOTAL
ARMY 5 7 12
NAVY 6 0 6
AIR FORCE 1 0 1
NO RESPONSE - - 2
TOTAL # OF SURVEYS RECEIVED 21  
Table 2.   Survey Respondents by Service 
Twelve responses were from military contracting professionals (67%) and 7 were civilian 
(33%) responses. Of the 21 responses received 12 were from the Army (5 military, 7 
civilian), 6 from the Navy (military only) and 1 response from the Air Force (military). 
Two respondents did not indicate what branch of the Department of Defense they served 
(both military).  
1. Background Information 
a. Country of Deployment 
The survey requested that respondents provide the names of countries that 
they had deployed to supporting contingency operations. They were provided a list of 
countries to choose from as well as a location to fill in the names of any countries not 
included in the survey. Multiple respondents indicated that they had deployed to several 
locations throughout their careers. Table 3 below contains the inclusive totals of those 












     Cuba 1
     Qatar 1
     Phillipines 1
     Republic of Georgia 1  
Table 3.   Contingency Locations 
Of the responses received, 86% indicated that they served in contingency operations in 
Iraq, 38% served in Kuwait, 14% in served in Afghanistan, and 21% deployed in support 
of U.S. Contingency Operations in other countries, such as, Bosnia, Qatar, Republic of 
Georgia, and Cuba.   
b. Years of Experience Prior to Deployment 
The range of experience levels depicted in Table 4 shows a majority of 
those deployed and supporting contingency operations had less than five years experience 







0 < x ≤ 2 7 33.33%
2 < x ≤ 5 7 33.33%
5 < x ≤ 10 3 14.29%
10 < x ≤ 15 1 4.76%
x > 15 3 14.29%
21 100.00%  





However, as a group, respondents had approximately six years of experience prior to 
their deployment.  The experience level of civilian contracting personnel versus military 
contracting personnel (Table 5 below) provides a different look at the experience level of 











0 < x ≤ 2 7 33.33% 0 < x ≤ 2 0 0.00%
2 < x ≤ 5 4 19.05% 2 < x ≤ 5 3 14.29%
5 < x ≤ 10 2 9.52% 5 < x ≤ 10 1 4.76%
10 < x ≤ 15 1 4.76% 10 < x ≤ 15 0 0.00%
x > 15 0 0.00% x > 15 3 14.29%
14 66.67% 7 33.33%
MILITARY CIVILIAN
 
Table 5.   Years of Contracting Experience; Civilian vs. Military 
It is apparent from Table 5 above that the military deploys its contracting professionals 
into the field much earlier in their careers (less than 5 years) than their civilian 
counterparts. The military respondents had an average of 3.39 years of experience while 
civilian respondents had an average of 11.71 years of experience. 
c. Position while Deployed 
As shown in Table 6, the majority of the respondents (66.67%) indicated 
that they held the position of Contracting Officer while deployed. In some instances a 
respondent held more than one position while deployed or may have provided 







Contracting Officer 12 2 66.67%
Contract Specialist 0 2 9.52%
Ordering Officer 0 0 0.00%
Other 2 5 33.33%
#
 
Table 6.   Positions Held While Deployed 
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In addition to the job of a contracting officer, 10% of respondents fulfilled contract 
specialist positions and 33% listed their job titles as ‘other,’ i.e., Chief of Contracting or 
Procurement Analyst.   
d. Contract Vehicles, Contract Types, and Contract Methods 
An acquisition professional has an array of contract vehicles, types, and 
methods available for awarding contracts supporting expeditionary operations. The type 
and quantity of the requirement normally drives a Contracting Officer’s decision 
regarding these areas. Table 7 below provides an overview of the contract vehicles, types, 
and methods that respondents stated were used in theater. 
 





Sealed Bidding, FAR Part 14 2 9.52%
Service Contracting, FAR Part 37 17 80.95%
Supply Contracts 18 85.71%
Construction Contracts 13 61.90%
Emergency Acquisition, FAR Part 18 4 19.05%
Information Technology, FAR Part 39 6 28.57%
Simplified Acquisition Procedures, FAR Part 13 20 95.24%
Contracting By Negotiation, FAR Part 15 17 80.95%
Non-Competitive Procedures 12 57.14%
Undefintized Contract Actions 9 42.86%
Letter Contracts 9 42.86%
Federal Supply Schedules, FAR Part 38 9 42.86%
Oral Solicitations/Oral Agreements 7 33.33%
Purchase Cards 7 33.33%
SF 44 and Cash Agreements 5 23.81%
Use of In-country Contracts 5 23.81%
Acquisition of Commercial Items, FAR Part 12 19 90.48%
Non-Commercial Acquisition 5 23.81%
Other 1 4.76% . 
Table 7.   Percentage use of Contract Action Types 
Multiple respondents indicated that they had utilized many contract action types in 
performing their duties in theater. As expected, the most common types used were 
Simplified Acquisition Procedures, used by over 95% of respondents, acquisition of 
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commercial items, used by over 90% of respondents, and supply contracts, used by over 
85% of respondents. Based upon an analysis of the contingent situation in Iraq, its 
volatile environment, and the need to rebuild the country’s infrastructure and economy, it 
is reasonable that these were the most highly utilized action types. One relatively 
surprising finding was that construction actions were utilized by (only) 61% of 
respondents.   
Many different contract types and methods were used as well. Table 8 
below reflects contract types and methods available to a contracting officer and the 
percentage used in theater by respondents.  





Firm Fixed Price (FFP) 21 100.00%
Fixed Price Incentive Fee (FPIF) 0 0.00%
Fixed Price Award Fee (FPAF) 1 4.76%
Fixed Price Level of Effort (FFP LOE) 0 0.00%
Fixed Price Redetermination 0 0.00%
Fixed Price with Economic Price Adjustment (FFP EPA) 0 0.00%
Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) 3 14.29%
Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) 3 14.29%
Cost-Plus-Award Fee (CPAF) 7 33.33%
Cost Contracts ($0 Fee) 0 0.00%
Time and Materials (T&M) 5 23.81%
Cost Sharing 0 0.00%
Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) 16 76.19%
Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA) 15 71.43%
Purchase Orders (PO) 14 66.67%
Requirements Contract 6 28.57%
Labor Hours 4 19.05%
Other 0 0.00%  
Table 8.   Percentage Use of Contract Types/Methods 
As expected, 100% of respondents utilized a Firm Fixed Price (FFP) 
vehicle during their deployments; more than any other contract type available. As most 
items procured in a contingent environment are commercial in nature (90.48% of 
respondent’s utilized commercial acquisitions per Table 7 above), a FFP contract type 
would be the expected vehicle of choice. Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ)  
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contracts, utilized by 76% of respondents, Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA) utilized 
by 71% of respondents, and Purchase Orders utilized by 67% of respondents were also 
commonly used contract methods.   
e. Dollar Value of Contingency Contract Actions  
The dollar value of an acquisition sets in motion the level of approvals and 
reviews needed for individual procurement actions. Depending if the action is a 
commercial or non-commercial procurement, the reviews can be tedious and lengthy. 
Table 9 below displays six different dollar value ranges, and the percentage that 









Table 9.   Dollar Value of Acquisitions in Theater 
There is a large range in contract values awarded in theater by respondents.  A total of 
29% of respondents stated that they were involved in contract actions that spanned a 
range of $5.5M – $100M. As this range is rather large, it is hard to determine if most 
actions fall at the low end (near $5.5M), at the high end (near $100M), or somewhere in 
between. This information would be useful to analyze because the threshold for a 
















$501K-$1M $1M-$5.5M $5.5M-$100M $101M-
$500M+
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f. Type of Item/Service Procured in Theater 
Table 10 below shows the type of commodities or services procured by 
respondents in theater. For this question, respondents provided a list of all services and 
supplies purchased to determine if there was a particular type of item/service purchased 


































Table 10.   Items/Services Procured in Theater 
As can be seen from the table above, a variety of items/services were purchased by 
respondents while in theater.  Office equipment/furniture (81%), construction 
supplies/services (76%), quality of life/Morale, Welfare, Recreation (MWR) (76%) 
communication equipment (67%), and sanitation (57%) were the most commonly 
purchased items/services.   
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2. Current Training Procedures 
Strong leadership, Army-wide government contract training, and deploying 
properly trained and experienced contracting professionals into a contingency 
environment are generally accepted components viewed as necessary for mission success. 
As contractual actions have become more complex, the demands of a fast paced, and 
high-stressed contingent environment often call for accurate and timely decision making 
skills. The premise is that the more experience and training a professional has, the better 
the chances are that s/he will use that experience to make consistent and proper business 
decisions.  
The numerous ongoing criminal investigations involving contract fraud 
committed by government personnel out of Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan as discussed in 
the Gansler report brings to the forefront the need for the Army to fundamentally improve 
contingency contract training and oversight. At the time the Gansler report was issued 
there were “…at least 78 open cases that involve a total of 103 personnel. Although the 
Air Force provides the large majority of the contracting personnel in-theater (70 percent 
in Iraq/Afghanistan), the overwhelming number of personnel involved in the 
investigations are Army (96)…”78 
Among many things that a deployed acquisition professional will likely face, the 
following are common factors that may tend to be overlooked prior to deployment:  
understanding the different rules and regulations between CONUS and OCONUS 
contracting; understanding overseas cultural differences; and adapting to a high-pressure 
work environment. Respondents provided data on their highest contracting certification 
level obtained, whether or not they received formal contingency contracting training prior 
to their deployment, and if so, which courses were taken and were they effective in 
preparing the respondent for the contingency environment. Their responses helped 
determine levels of training provided prior to deployment, areas of training, and areas 
needing more and/or better training. 
                                                 
78 United States Army. (October 2007).Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations, p. 22. 
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a.  Contracting Certification Level 
Of 21 responses received, prior to their deployment, 15% held a Level I, 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Contracting Certification, 
49% were Level II certified, and 36% were Level III certified. One respondent did not 












Table 11.   Contracting Certification Level 
This chart appears to support the notion that the Army is attempting to comply with 
DAWIA requirements. However, while the chart shows that a majority of contracting 
professionals hold, at a minimum, a Level II certification in contracting prior to 
deploying overseas, it does not compare the certification level to how many years 
contracting experience each individual held. For example, 10 respondents stated that they 
held a Level II certification prior to deployment. However, the range of years of 
experience amongst these respondents fell between 0.5 years to 5 years experience, with 
the average being 2.9 years of experience. There may be no substitute for hands on 
experience, and while individuals may hold a specific certification level, it does not 
necessarily mean that they are properly trained to perform and handle their duties in a 
contingency environment. 
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b.  Contingency Contracting Training Received  
Table 12 below depicts the number of respondents, by Service, who 
received formal contingency contracting training prior to deploying overseas.  
Army Navy Air Force Unknown Total %
YES 9 6 1 2 18 85.71%
NO 3 0 0 0 3 14.29%  
Table 12.   Formal Contingency Contracting Received 
A total of 86% of respondents stated that they received formal contingency contracting 
training prior to deploying.  The three respondents that did not receive any type/level of 
training prior to deploying were from the Army, (2 civilian and 1 military). It can be 
noted that while these members deployed in support of contracting functions, they did not 
fill the positions of contracting officer or contract specialist.  Fourteen percent of 
respondents stated that they had not received formal contingency contracting training 
prior to deploying.  This finding might further stimulate Army leaders to fundamentally 
improve this statistic. Generally accepted knowledge is that one way to lessen contract 
fraud is to invest in systematic training. Army leaders could insist on providing 100% of 
the needed training to all contracting workforce members.   
  To determine the types of courses provided to deploying personnel, those 
who responded “Yes” were asked to provide the names of courses taken and if they were 
effective in preparing them for their duties in the field. Prior to discussing the results of 
this section, it can be noted that these questions were intended to be answered only if a 
respondent checked that they had received ‘formal’ contingency contracting training. 
However, two of the respondents who stated that they did not receive ‘formal’ 
contingency contracting training, also completed this section. Therefore, survey question 
1 under the heading “current training procedures’ which resulted in the responses 
displayed in Table 12 may be somewhat ambiguous. Since ‘formal’ contingency 
contracting was not defined in the survey, it was up to the respondents to interpret the 
definition themselves and answer accordingly. 
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Table 13 below depicts the training courses provided and the percentage 
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Other Agency Provided Course
No training courses taken
 
Table 13.   Training Courses Attended 
Survey questions regarding the effectiveness of courses taken used the 






AGREE N/A  
These survey questions required the respondent to indicate the extent to which they agree 
or disagree with a particular statement. For example, “CON 234, Contingency 
Contracting was effective and prepared me for a contingency contracting deployment.” 
Choices ranged from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree.” Table 14 below provides 
a view of the respondent’s opinions of the effectiveness of each training course taken in 








CON 234 ' Contingency Contracting' 2 10 3 0 6
DAU Equivalent to CON 234 0 2 0 1 18
Anti-Terrorism Training 1 16 2 1 1
Ethics Training 3 14 2 1 1
Cultural Awareness Training 4 13 2 0 2
Other Agency Provided Course 1 3 0 0 17
RESPONDENT ANSWER
 
Table 14.   Effectiveness of Training Courses 
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For the below analysis, the choices “Strongly Agree” and “Agree” were combined, as 
were the choices “Strongly Disagree” and “Disagree.” For the courses listed above, 
respondents generally indicated that the courses were somewhat effective in preparing 
them for a deployment. Eighty-five percent of those respondents who took both Ethics 
and Anti-terrorism training felt that the courses were effective and prepared them for 
deployment, while 15% disagreed. Of the 19 respondents that received Cultural 
Awareness training, 89% agreed that the course was effective while 11% did not agree. 
For the individuals who took the Defense Acquisition University’s (DAU) Contingency 
Contracting Officer training (CON 234) 80% agreed that the course was effective while 
20% disagreed, and of those that took the DAU equivalent of CON 234 (such as the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Contingency Contracting course) 67% agreed that it was 
effective while 33% did not agree. In contrast, of the 19% that took agency specific 
training courses, 100% indicated the training as effective.    
c.  Learning Curve 
The Gansler report indicated that deployed contracting personnel 
experienced approximately a six-week learning curve in theatre; the time period that it 
takes for personnel to shift their ‘mindset’ regarding contracting procedures from a 
CONUS to an OCONUS perspective.  The fast paced tempo of a contingency 
environment places demands on contracting professionals that they are not used to. For 
example, the Commission heard testimony describing the, “…steep learning curve 
repeatedly faced by newly deployed contracting personnel who must quickly understand 
that a $50 million source selection in-theater needs to be accomplished in six weeks, not 
the six or more months that would be a highly accelerated CONUS contracting time 
table.”79  The sample that was taken in this survey support the Gansler findings, e.g., 
respondents experienced an average six week learning curve.  
                                                 
79 United States Army. (October 2007). Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations, p. 26. 
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3. Current Resources  
The third set of questions that respondents answered dealt with the availability of 
resources/contract tools in theater and if they were useful for completing contract duties. 
The responses to these questions helped identify areas in which respondents felt that 
contract tools and resources were adequate, including suggested areas for improvement. 
a. Availability of Internet Access 
As many electronic resources and changing contracting legislation and 
policies are continuously updated on the internet, having internet access is an essential 
capability (tool) for deployed contracting professionals. It provides needed access to a 
multitude of resources, similar to the demands of a CONUS position.  While deployed, 
respondents indicated that they had internet access an average of 85% of the time. 
b. Contract Tools/Resources Used 
Respondents were given a list of the most common tools/resources utilized 
in theater and were requested to reveal if they had access to and/or used the tools once in 
theater, including whether the resource/tool aided the respondent in completing their 
overseas contract requirements. They were also given a section to write in any 
resources/tools not listed.  Table 15 below provides an overview of the tools/resources 
evaluated and how many respondents had access to and/or used the resources. 
YES NO YES NO
FAR/DFARS/AFARS 21 0 20 1
Sample Contracts 19 2 16 5
Sample ARP Documents 5 16 5 16
Document Templates 20 1 18 3
On-the-Job Training 17 4 14 7
Access To Used
 
Table 15.   Contract Tools/Resource Availability  
Review of the responses received shows that a majority of respondents had access to 
and/or used the above referenced tools while in theater.  Of those that used the tools, a 
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majority agreed that use of the tool/s was helpful. Seven respondents provided examples 
of additional tools/resources that were also utilized in theater: 
• ‘we developed our own tools as needed,’ 
• ‘contracting related websites such as CCR, EPLS, DFAS, GSA, 
NAICS,’  
• five mentioned that they relied on ‘needed to reach back to CONUS 
for better samples/templates and support,’   
• ‘JCC I/A polices & procedures,’  
• ‘Joint Contingency Contracting System,’  
• ‘JCC I/A websites.” 
c.  Lessons Learned 
Among many things called for in the Gansler report was a need to capture 
contracting ‘lessons learned’ from OEF and OIF, including placing lessons in one system 
for ease of access and informational purposes. When asked if they had access to ‘lessons 
learned’ prior to deploying overseas, 57% responded positively. Of those that had access 
to this information, a majority of respondents (83%) indicated that they used the lessons 
learned.  In addition, 90% of those who used the lessons learned agreed that they were 
helpful 
4. Improving Future Processes and Procedures 
To evaluate if Army implementation of the Gansler recommendations would 
address the needs of those deployed in support of expeditionary operations, respondents 
were asked several questions concerning improving the future of contingency 
contracting. A small percentage of respondents felt that there were certain tools/resources 
lacking in availability during deployment, such as, sample contracts (24%), document 
templates (19%), and on-the-job training (14%). Many stated that ‘better’ quality samples 
were needed, although they were not asked to comment on the quality of the samples. 
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One respondent said that without internet connectivity it is almost impossible to get the 
FAR/DFARS/AFARS.  Additionally, depending on the country, some IP addresses block 
the FAR/DFARS/AFARS websites.   
a. Challenges Facing Contracting Professionals in the Field 
To obtain an overall understanding of macro challenges facing deployed 
contracting professionals, respondents ranked a set of challenges from 1 to 5 (1 = the 
biggest challenge and 5 = the smallest challenge). Respondents were also given the 
opportunity to include challenges that were not included in the survey question.  Table 16 






Lack of Support  
Table 16.   List of Challenges 
The resulting order of perceived challenges is provided below (1 being the greatest 
challenge): 
1. Time Pressure 
2. Lack of Training 
3. Lack of Support 
4. Hostile Environment 
5. Long Working Hours 
Respondents were also given the opportunity to provide, ‘other’ challenges that they 
faced in the field that were not included in the choices above: 
• No equipment 
• Lack of properly trained requirements personnel- “Long hours 
often due to this” 
• Volume of contract work 
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• Inefficient manpower 
• Lack of experience 
• Quick Turnover of personnel 
• Electricity goes down all of the time- effective productivity 
 
b.  How can Contingency Contracting be improved? 
Contracting processes and procedures incrementally evolve, and 
contracting in a contingent environment generates additional pressures to adapt quickly. 
It may be this accelerated adaptation that poses increased pressures. Table 17 depicts 
areas where field respondents indicated that more and/or better training was needed to 
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Table 17.   Improvements needed to Contingency Contracting  
The top three requested areas of improvements or needs requested by respondents were 
an increase of sample documents (81%), sample contracts (76%), and the need for more 
contract files to be electronic (71%).   
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c. Areas for Improved Training 
The final question in the survey asked respondents to provide 
recommended training topics for the Army to focus on to improve the overall contracting 
process. Table 18 below provides a list of possible training topics and the percentage of 















































































































































































































































Table 18.   Contracting Areas for Improvement 
The most commonly recommended training topics were those for review of existing 
authority levels (71%), local/vendor base experience (67%),  simplified acquisition 
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procedures (62%), market research in-country (67%), base operations support (57%), 
fund types and fiscal policy (57%), and host nation agreement / SOFA / Treaties (52%).  
C. INTERVIEW RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Five semi-structured interviews were conducted to obtain different perspectives 
regarding the research topics.  As mentioned in previous chapters, Mr. Jeff Parsons, 
Executive Director of the new Army Contracting Command, was interviewed in May 
2008. Two (2) Army civilian contracting personnel, one (1) Navy military requirements 
personnel (currently deployed at the time of the interview), and one (1) Navy military 
contracting officer who had recently returned from Iraq were interviewed as well.  While 
each interview was tailored with specific questions based upon the position and rank in 
the contracting community, as well as, specific roles conducted in contingency 
operations, each interview had a general theme to uncover and indentify problems within 
the Army’s contracting structure and to determine which contracting areas could be 
improved to provide a more efficient and effective contracting system. The results of the 
interviews are presented as an analysis of common problems/challenges revealed during 
the interviews, and in some cases, interviewees provided their own recommended 
solutions to help fix the problems/challenges identified.  The analysis revealed six (6) key 
issues identified below. Further discussion of each issue is provided in subsequent 
paragraphs. 
• Experience Level of Contingency Contracting/Requirements Personnel 
• Lessons Learned 
• Ethics and Cultural Awareness 
• Contract Tools 
• Length of Deployment 
• Knowing What to Expect Prior to Deployment. 
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1. Experience Level of Contingency Contracting/Requirements 
Personnel 
There was a general consensus among interviewees that not only is there a need 
for more contingency contracting personnel, but there is a need for more experienced 
personnel.  The requirements specialist interviewed was a Navy LCDR currently 
deployed in Iraq.  His general statement concerning the contracting office where he 
worked provides a good overall summary:  “those guys are moving mountains with a 
small workforce.”  As a customer, he sees the large workload coming through and the 
contract offices understaffed to handle that workload.  The billet he holds required 
contracting experience, and he was chosen as a subject matter expert based on his 2.5 
years of experience. 
When asked how many years of contracting experience people should have before 
they are sent into the field, some felt that there should be a minimum amount/years of 
training/experience prior to their eligibility to deploy. They also felt that there should be a 
minimum level of contracting certification. One interviewee felt that personnel should 
have at a minimum, a Level II DAWIA contracting certification and at least one year of 
hands-on experience.  He said that there are too many Level I CCOs, especially in the 
military, and that having to train people “how to” once they are in the field adversely 
impacted the entire contracting process.  A key point made was that contracting personnel 
should be familiar with the FAR and understand how to make good business decisions.  
In contrast to the response above, another interviewee felt that contracting personnel 
should have a minimum of five (5) years of experience for both civilian and military 
contracting personnel, and a Level III DAWIA contracting certification.  He felt that this 
would provide a solid foundation for contracting in an OCONUS environment.   
It is important to note that currently under the Army Civilian Training, Education, 
and Development System Plan for the CP-14 Contracting and Acquisition Career 
Program, the intern program is a three-year training program.  Once the intern has 
completed the program, the individual should possess all the competencies, or 
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knowledge, skills and abilities required to perform at the journeyman level. This 
information was used to further analyze experience requirements.80   
2. Lessons Learned 
Most of the personnel interviewed agreed that the lessons learned system is a 
useful way to prepare for deployment.  However, they added that it was essential to share 
the most current lessons learned due to the evolving nature of contingency contracting.  A 
point was made that talking with someone who has just returned from a contingency 
operation is more beneficial and effective in preparing for a deployment then reading 
outdated reports written by someone who had returned months or years prior. He said, 
“the fresher the information, the better it was.” 
3. Ethics and Cultural Awareness 
When asked what they felt that were some of the biggest problems/barriers to 
accomplishing the mission, one subject who had deployed in Iraq said that he 
experienced specific problems related to cultural awareness and ethics.  The language 
barrier was a great challenge; however, he was fortunate to have two interpreters while 
some contracting offices had none.  He also mentioned that cultural differences regarding 
business practices were a challenge.  For example, a military construction project was 
needed to be completed in an expedited manner; however, the need for the requirement 
was not viewed as urgent by the Iraqi company that was contracted to complete the 
project.  Another interviewee suggested that there should be some sort of ‘geographic 
training’ given to contracting personnel prior to their deployment. He said that a location-
based training would he helpful in future contingencies, mainly because we have no way 
of knowing where or what the next operation will involve. 
Another challenge that was identified was trying to implement U.S. federal 
acquisition regulation business practices into an Iraqi culture that is unaccustomed to U.S. 
                                                 
80 Army Civilian Personnel On-line. Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System 
(Plan CP-14- Contracting and Acquisition Career Program). Retrieved September 2008 from 
http://www.cpol.army.mil/library/train/acteds/CP_14/chap10.html. 
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business practices. Iraqi contractors simply did not relate well to U.S. government ethical 
standards developed over the past decades.  Additionally, the subject mentioned that not 
all government personnel, particularly requiring activities, were properly trained on the 
topic of ethics.  Some of the inexperienced requirements personnel that this interviewee 
worked with talked directly to the Iraqi contractors, a practice which could lead to 
modifications that are out of the scope of the Statement of Work, and ultimately to waste, 
fraud and abuse.  Contracting personnel found themselves having to take the time out of 
hectic schedules to train the requirements personnel on ethics.  When asked how the 
Army could better train its workforce, he said, “There are some ‘ethically challenged’ 
people over there; (so he would advise) continue to ram ethics down the throats of 
everybody there.”  When asked the same question, another interviewee told us something 
similar, that the senior leaders need to understand ethics regulations, as well as, their 
subordinates. 
4. Contract Tools 
Almost all those interviewed agreed that electronic contract files would help 
improve modern wartime contracting. One individual who is currently in Iraq said that 
some of the current processes within his contracting office are completed electronically, 
but not everything is online. He felt that many current procedures would be improved if 
there was one electronic system for all team members to utilize, particularly in routing 
documents for approval up the chain of command.  He also said that many higher 
authority reviewers did not use the same system that subordinates did, which oftentimes 
made a very slow and inefficient review process.  Additionally, once a document moved 
on to the next approval level, reviews would get kicked back for questions and oftentimes 
the ‘visibility’ and status of the documents would be lost. 
Another interviewee said that a uniform electronic contract file system utilized 
among all of the contracting offices would be beneficial. He believed that if all contract 
files could be shared, there would a lessons learned benefit from doing so. In addition, it 
was suggested that an electronic contract file system that had access to all theatre 
contracts could be managed at CONUS locations. Contract documents, templates, and 
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policy information could also be available electronically to all those deployed; yet be 
managed by a single CONUS team.  Deploying an electronic system as just described 
would help increase the quality of sample documents, as it would create common 
templates for those in the field.  The researchers were informed that each contracting 
office in Iraq has its own hard copy contract files and contractual samples were not good. 
Many times when a sample was needed, “you were at the mercy of the guy who wrote the 
template” and oftentimes, “the experience level of the guy writing the template may not 
have been up to par to begin with.”       
When asked to comment on whether they would have benefited from a federal 
acquisition regulation tailored to contingency contracting, many mentioned that the 
resources available in theatre are adequate. They said that they used the Acquisition 
Instruction (AI) and it worked well.  
5. Length of Deployment 
Many interviewees expressed their concerns regarding the length of deployment 
for military and civilian contracting personnel. Two said that civilian deployments should 
range from 12 to 15 months. They mentioned a problem of short enlistments on the 
military side as well, e.g., some complete their time and get out as soon as possible.  This 
creates additional retention/staffing problems. The requirements specialist said that they 
would push to prepare acquisition requirements packages and oftentimes they would not 
be deployed long enough to see them through.  The already shortened deployment 
periods are further condensed when personnel are sent into contingencies without any 
experience.  In this case, not only is time spent on training personnel on basic contracting 
principles, but time is taken away from the individual doing the training.  Having to train 
personnel the “how-to” of contracting in theatre is time consuming and counter-
productive. 
6.  Knowing What to Expect Prior to Deployment 
Some interviewees said that knowing what to expect prior to deployment would 
help personnel better prepare for operations. One said that having an idea of 1) where 
 72
they were going to be deployed, 2) what type of item/service they most likely will be 
purchasing, 3) what tools and/or resources are available in theater, and 4) what type of 
contract/action types to expect, would be extremely beneficial to personnel prior to their 
deployment.  Having this information would help them plan location based training 




VII.  CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AREAS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
This Joint Applied Project analyzed the extent to which Army leadership has 
acknowledged and is acting upon key improvement recommendations made by the 
Gansler Report (2007). The project explored roles, procedures, principles and emerging 
issues facing contingency contracting professionals in respect to their responsibilities in 
expeditionary operations.  The first chapters explored basic principles of contingency 
contracting and identified four key areas that affect the Army’s ability to effectively and 
efficiently respond in contingency contracting situations;  the changing war environment, 
increased contracting workload and complexity of contract actions, increased 
responsibility of acquisition professionals, and declining capability of the acquisition 
workforce.  Later chapters presented the Gansler report findings and recommendations 
and researched the extent to which the Army is acting upon key improvements.  The last 
chapter analyzed researcher developed surveys and semi-structured interviews given to 
current and previously deployed contingency contracting personnel, in order to approach 
this topic with a ‘boots on the ground’ perspective.   
From the research conducted, an overarching conclusion is that the Army is 
successfully implementing and utilizing the Gansler Commission recommendations.  
However, there are additional steps that the Army can take to improve modern wartime 
contingency contracting and better prepare and train its contracting workforce. This 
chapter provides additional recommendations for the Army to further enhance 
improvements in future contingency operations. The chapter summarizes answers to 
research questions posed in Chapter I, including potential areas for further research.  
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A. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How Have the Roles, Responsibilities, Procedures, and Challenges of 
U.S. Army Contracting Professionals Changed to Accommodate 
Wartime Needs and Expectations?  
During operations supporting the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Army 
contingency contracting roles have expanded and become more complex. Stimulated by 
exponential developments in information technology, Army overseas contracting 
personnel are also experiencing the need for increasingly specialized contracting 
expertise and training to accomplish warfare missions.  Increased demand has generated 
an influx of private contractors on the battlefield. Per Chapter I, metrics indicate there are 
more contractors on the battlefield than ever before. Contracting in contingency 
operations, in particular, has risen to the forefront of providing essential background 
support to time-sensitive mission objectives in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Over the past several years, contingency contracting 
support has grown from simplified acquisition procedures to complex defense system 
acquisitions, interagency support, services, and military construction. Regardless of this 
rapid transition, contingency contracting personnel are responsible for maintaining 
accurate and complete contract files in a complex and high threat environment. They 
have to adapt to new procedures, new technology, and new scheduling demands, i.e., 
civilian contracting personnel deploy overseas on a volunteer basis only. 
Over the last two decades, contracting professionals have tried to adapt to 
substantial workforce reductions, increases in workload, increasingly complex 
requirements, and a need for additional skill sets. Contracting Officers have also 
experienced a shift in procedures and have been tasked to adapt to changes in 
procurement laws and regulations, such as recent acquisition reform under the Services 
Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA). 
Chapter III notes that today’s contracting professionals are confronted with at least four 
key issues/challenges affecting their roles and responsibilities as a contracting 
professional: a changing war environment, increased workload and complexity of 
contracting actions, increased responsibility, and a declining capability of the contracting 
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workforce. The Army does appear to acknowledge the degree of difficulties, and has 
begun developing and implementing new processes, procedures, and training programs to 
better prepare its workforce to support conventional and unconventional contracting 
situations.  
2. How is Army Leadership Responding to Contingency Contracting 
Key Improvement Recommendations for Changes, Including 
Acknowledgement of Weaknesses, Plans to Solve Charges of Waste 
and Inefficiency, and Overcoming Implementation Impediments?   
Since the issuance of the Gansler Report in November 2007, which identified and 
brought to the forefront systematic problems within the Army’s contracting procedures, 
the Army is substantially responding to the Commissions findings. The Army has 
acknowledged multiple weaknesses and is taking early steps to address them. It has 
initiated reviews and investigations into determining ways to solve  the problems 
associated with charges of waste, fraud, and abuse, and has also implemented plans to 
create a more efficient and effective contracting organization; starting with the stand up 
of the ACC.   
3. How is the Army Developing More and Better Trained Contracting 
Professionals? 
The Army is making progress toward developing more and better trained contract 
professionals.  It is working with the DAU to develop a focused expeditionary 
contracting training program that will provide an in depth look at contracting in an 
OCONUS situation. Another training opportunity that the Army is looking into is ways to 
improve contingency contracting training currently provided at its Combined Training 
Centers. The Army has also instituted new policies regarding minimum training 
requirements for Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs). Although the Army has 
effectively taken these steps to develop better trained contracting professionals, there is a 
need for more specialized training topics to be incorporated into a training curriculum.  
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4. What “Contracting Tools,” Procedures and/or Personnel Policy 
Modifications Could Be Considered as Ways to Augment and 
Stabilize the Contingency Contracting Community’s Ability to 
Perform in the Context of a Long War? 
Current procedures could be improved by developing one electronic system for all 
team members to utilize.  A web-based system, such as the CECOM LCMC Acquisition 
Center’s Project Contract Folder (PCF), would allow reviewers in remote locations to 
share sample contracts and information, files can be managed by a single CONUS team, 
and contract/document templates and the latest policy information could be available 
electronically to all those deployed.  Regarding personnel policy modifications, the Army 
should re-examine the length of deployment for civilian contracting personnel and review 
the minimum amount of years experience necessary to successfully perform their 
contracting missions in contingency operations.  These factors definitely impact the 
contingency contracting community’s ability to perform in the context of the long war. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Overall, the Army is successfully implementing and utilizing the Gansler 
Commission recommendations.  From the research conducted for this project, and review 
and analysis of the surveys and semi-structured interviews, additional recommendations 
are provided to improve modern wartime contingency contracting and better prepare and 
train the contracting workforce. Specifically, five (5) key recommendations are provided:  
• Implement a Single Electronic Contracting System to Support all Army 
Contingency Contracting Efforts 
• Re-examine the Minimum Hands-On Experience Requirement for Contracting 
• Capture, Share and continually Update Current Lessons Learned Information 
• Re-examine the Length of Deployment for Civilian Contingency Contracting 
Personnel 
• Implement Suggested Training Topics for Future Deployed Contingency 
Contracting Personnel  
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These five recommendations are further addressed below. 
1. Implement a Single Web-Based Contracting System to Support All 
Army Contingency Contracting Efforts 
Current procedures could be improved if one uniform electronic contract file 
system was created and utilized by all contracting offices in a theater of operation; 
including the functionality to be able to access all theatre contracts.  For example, 
currently each contingency contracting office in the JCC I/A has its own hard copies of 
contract files. As a result, these offices are unable to efficiently and expeditiously share 
these contract files.  However, a web-based system, such as the CECOM LCMC 
Acquisition Center’s Project Contract Folder (PCF) would allow reviewers in remote 
locations to share sample contracts and information.  It would also enhance the 
review/approval process as there would now be one point of entry for all individuals to 
access contract files. Additionally, with implementation of the PCF program, files can be 
reviewed and managed by those in a CONUS location.  Reviewers at all levels could 
access contract files and provide a visible contract status at all times to ensure maximum 
visibility.  Contract/document templates and the latest policy information could be 
available electronically to all those deployed.  This information could be managed by a 
single CONUS team as well, to ensure all deployed personnel have access to the most 
timely regulations and policy information. 
Furthermore, the recent Joint Contingency Contracting Officer handbook is an 
extremely useful tool to contracting professionals.  This tool is especially beneficial to 
those deployed to locations where access to on-line resources is limited, such as a stage 1 
(mobilization) or stage 2 (build-up) contingency operations, or deployment to a remote 
area.  However, the Joint Contingency Handbook can be viewed as a ‘temporary fix’.  A 
uniform, web-based system should be implemented as soon as feasible to ensure 
maximum efficiency in accomplishing missions. 
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2. Re-examine the Minimum Hands-On Experience Requirement for 
Contracting 
The first recommendation of the Gansler report addressed the need to increase the 
contracting workforce, specifically stating the need for more trained and experienced 
military personnel. One of the recommendations in particular is that the Army must 
ensure that expeditionary operations are not a first assignment.  Research in Chapter V 
has revealed that the Army has instituted a policy stating that military members will not 
deploy during their first year in contracting. While this is a good attempt at ensuring that 
those who deploy overseas are properly trained, one year of experience may not suffice to 
handle operations in a contingent environment.  
One year of experience simply is not enough; it does not adequately provide 
personnel with a solid foundation in basic contracting.  For example, currently under the 
Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System Plan for the CP-14 
Contracting and Acquisition Career Program, the intern program is a three-year training 
program.  Once the intern has completed the program, the individual should possess all 
the competencies, or knowledge, skills and abilities required to perform at the 
journeyman level. Therefore, Army civilian interns will not reach journeyman status until 
they have completed at least three years of hands-on experience.  
Personnel deploying in support of a contingency operation should require very 
little, if any, training while deployed in theatre as they should already have a solid 
foundation in contracting processes and procedures.  In an era of increasingly complex 
contracting actions and the increased reliance of contractors on the battlefield, 
experienced personnel are essential in expeditionary contracting missions. It is evident 
that there is a need for more contracting personnel.  However, little is added if the Army 
sends classroom trained personnel into theatre without a minimum amount of hands-on 
experience in CONUS contracting, even if they have a Master’s degree and DAWIA 
Level III certification.   
The Army needs to review its training requirements for its deployable workforce; 
specifically the minimum number of years of experience required to deploy. The Army 
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may find that the minimum number of years of hands on experience should be increased 
to the equivalent of a journeyman status of 3 years. 
If the Army agrees that an increase in the number of years experience required to 
deploy is necessary, it may also be determined that the Army does not have enough 
personnel available to deploy that possess the revised amount of CONUS contracting 
experience. In these cases, the Army could consider developing standards where 
deployed personnel are sent to locations based upon matching experience to a job 
assignment, much like the Yoder Three Tier Model (Appendix B).  For example, 
individuals with one year of experience could be deployed to a position that requires less 
experience, such as placing orders on existing contracts or contractual actions under 
simplified acquisition procedures. Individuals with three or more years of contracting 
experience could be assigned to a position that requires higher level duties such as 
interfacing with local and regional businesses, creating business processes, and 
coordinating with military, non-governmental organizations, private volunteer 
organizations, and political organizations. This would leave the most experienced and 
deployable personnel available to support hostile, high threat contingency environment 
where their skill sets and experience will allow them to make proper business decisions 
and complete contract actions expeditiously.  
3. Capture, Share, and Continually Update Current Lessons Learned 
Information 
As described in Chapter IV, a recommendation of the Gansler report was the need 
to capture and utilize lessons learned from contingent environments. Research has 
revealed that the Army is formally interviewing units as they return from theater to 
capture “expeditionary contracting” lessons learned and incorporating the findings into 
doctrine, training guides, and user handbooks. This appears to be an extremely useful 
method of capturing lessons learned.  However, lessons learned must be continually 
updated to match the realities of a fast-changing theatre.    
The Army could develop and institute a lessons learned training course involving 
members of the Acquisition community who have recently returned from a deployment. 
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As a requirement and duty of their deployment, all recently returned military and civilian 
contracting personnel could participate in contingency contracting training sessions for 
members of the acquisition force set to deploy to contingent environments in the near 
future.  Those who have recently returned would provide value to their counterparts 
because experiences and lessons learned would be fresh. Recently returned personnel 
could also provide location specific training to further enhance the lessons-learned 
benefit.  A benefit to the Army from this type of training is that the training sessions 
could be videotaped and streamed over the internet so that they reach the maximum 
amount of personnel. The course could then be archived into the Army’s lessons learned 
system for future reference. 
4. Re-examine the Length of Deployment for Civilian Contingency 
Contracting Personnel 
The Gansler report indicated that even trained and experienced contracting 
personnel have a learning curve of about six weeks in theatre. This learning curve is the 
time period that it takes for personnel to shift their ‘mindset’ regarding contracting 
procedures from CONUS to an OCONUS perspective.  Likewise, the analysis of survey 
results in Chapter VI confirmed this finding, as respondents on average, reported the 
same six week learning curve.  
Civilian contracting personnel are deployed in support of contingency operations 
for up to 180 days; which from research and interviews conducted, may not be enough 
time to execute contract actions, especially when taking the learning curve into 
consideration. Personnel indicated that they were often not deployed long enough to see 
actions through.  The already shortened deployment periods are further condensed when 
personnel are sent into contingencies with little experience in the subject matter.  The use 
of increasingly complex contracting actions may, in certain instances, further preclude a 
civilian’s ability to effectively accomplish contracting missions during their limited 
deployment period.  
As a result, longer civilian deployments may be necessary to best accomplish 
missions.   It is recommended that the ACC, and particularly the ECC, re-examine the 
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length of deployments for civilian contracting personnel.  The Army may find that 
deployment periods of 12 to 15 months, similar to their military counterparts, may be 
more effective. 
5. Suggested Training Topics for Future Deployed Contingency 
Contracting Personnel  
The Gansler Commission also recommended that the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) develop training for the civilian and military contracting workforce 
specific to expeditionary operations.  As mentioned in Chapter V, the Army responded to 
this request by stating that they are re-examining the training curriculum for all newly 
accessed acquisition officers and civilians. However, no further information regarding the 
DAU/Army’s research or planning for specific training topics was found.  
There are fairly specific areas where the Army can focus training initiatives, and 
the following topics could be incorporated into a contingency contracting training 
curriculum:   
• Review of existing authorities/Emergency Legislation, 
• Local/vendor base experience, 
• Simplified acquisition procedures,  
• Market research in-country, 
• Base operations support, 
• Fund types and fiscal policy, and 
• Host nation agreement / SOFA / Treaties. 
It is important to mention that the Army is providing contingency contracting 
personnel training in the areas of cultural awareness and ethics training.  Inadequate 
ethics and cultural awareness training can create systemic problems and barriers to 
accomplishing the mission.  Cultural differences regarding business practices and 
language issues must be addressed.  Location-based training might be helpful in properly 
preparing contracting personnel.  The Army can ensure that all parties involved in the 
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acquisition process understand and follow definitive ethics procedures and guidelines.  
Ensuring that ethical standards are upheld in contingency operations is not the sole 
responsibility of the contracting office; it is a shared responsibility by all Army personnel 
including requirements personnel and senior leaders.  
The Army can compile and analyze procurement data specific to contingency 
operations to create more specific training programs for its future deployed workforce.  
Research in Chapter VI revealed common types of items/services purchased, 
methods/contracts and contract actions types used in expeditionary operations, such as:  
• Commercial Items,  
• Supplies/Services,  
• Contracting by negotiation,  
• Construction, 
• Non-competitive, 
• Firm Fixed Price  
• Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ), 
• Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA), and  
• Purchase Orders.  
Specific procurement data such as this can be used to pinpoint training areas to further 
tailor individual learning prior to deployment.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Throughout the research process, many areas were uncovered that, while outside 
the general scope of this project, warrant further investigation and research to determine 
the feasibility of implementation into current Army contracting processes. Provided 
below are areas that the researchers believe should be investigated further. 
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1. Could the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Serve 
As a Template for Future Reach Back Programs for Contingency 
Operations? 
The Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) is currently 
located at the Army Sustainment Command (ASC), located in Rock Island, IL.  
LOGCAP uses civilian contractors to provide the Army with additional means to 
adequately support the current and programmed force by performing selected services in 
wartime as well as other operations, i.e. Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, Peace 
Keeping, Peace Enforcement, and Major/Minor Conflict.81 The LOGCAP contract dates 
to 1992, when a contract for support services was awarded by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers.  Since its inception, the LOGCAP program has supported operations in a 
variety of countries under multiple contractors. LOGCAP has been used to support U.S. 
forces in operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia and is currently being used to support 
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Uzbekistan, as well as in other countries. 
The use of LOGCAP to support U.S. troops in Iraq is the largest effort in the history of 
LOGCAP.82  
Currently, the ASC has LOGCAP III and IV. Three types of services are 
delivered under the LOGCAP IV performance  contracts: supply operations, such as the 
delivery of food, water, fuel, spare parts and other items; field operations, such as dining 
and laundry facilities, housing, sanitation, waste management, postal services, and 
morale, welfare and recreation activities; and other operations, including engineering and 
construction, support to communication networks, transportation and cargo services, and 
facilities maintenance and repair.83  
One of the researchers had the benefit of participating in the Army’s Procurement 
Management Assistance Program (PMAP) Contracting Operations Review at ASC in 
                                                 
81 Michael S. Neeb. (December 2004) The Performance of LOGCAP in Operations Enduring and 
Iraqi Freedom. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School. 
82 U.S. Government Accountability Office. (March 2005). High-Level DoD Coordination is Needed to 
Further Improve the Management of the Army’s LOGCAP Contract (GAO Report No. 05-328), p. 5-6. 
83 Association of the United States Army. (June 2008). Three Firms to Split LOGCAP Contract. Retrieved 
September 2008 from http://www.ausa.org/publications/ausanews/archives/06-
08/Pages/ThreefirmstosplitLOGCAPcontract.aspx. 
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July of 2008, in which an Army team was complied to examine LOGCAP contract files.  
The purpose of the PMAP Contracting Operations Review Program is to assess the health 
of Army contracting, improve the overall quality of Army contracting and to assist in 
management control.  A review of ASC’s LOGCAP contract files yielded extremely 
positive results. The team concluded that the files are in excellent order, well 
documented, indicate in-depth analysis of the requirement, and how to process and award 
the solicitation.  Additionally, since the reach back contracts for Kuwait and Qatar have 
transferred from CENTCOM to ASC, the Army has saved $94M.  For example, three (3) 
Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCA) proposed at $285M were definitized by ASC in 
the amount of $191M ($94M in savings), where previously four (4)  UCAs negotiated in 
theatre, before ASC,  proposed at $279M, were definitized at $279M ($0 savings).84   
In the past, allegations of waste, fraud and abuse have loomed over the program, 
launching media attention and several investigations including GAO reports. However, 
the researchers believe that the current LOGCAP reach back program at ASC is 
effectively accomplishing mission requirements and should serve as a template for future 
missions.  The Army may want to further research the accomplishments of the current 
program to use as template for future contingencies. 
2. How to Implement Project Contract Folder (PCF) In a Contingency 
Environment. 
The Army may want to research ways to implement CECOM LCMC Acquisition 
Center’s Project Contract Folder (PCF) in contingency operations.  As mentioned in the 
recommendations above, the currently released version of PCF that is used in the 
CECOM Acquisition Center, possesses many of the required functionalities to 
successfully utilize a uniform electronic contracting system in different geographical 
locations.  Additional research should be conducted to determine if PCF can be further 
developed and tailored to expeditionary operations. 
                                                 
84 Army Sustainment Command (July 2008). Procurement Management Assistance Program Outbrief, 
(Power Point Slides- DRAFT). 
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3. How to Best Capture and Utilize Lessons Learned Information 
The Army may want to research ways to best capture and utilize lessons learned 
information.  As mentioned in the recommendations above, there are several ways to 
capture the most current lessons learned, however further research is needed to determine 
the most appropriate method of disseminating information. For example, further research 
is needed to assess the feasibility of implementing in person training or video recorded 
information sharing of lessons learned.  
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, additional steps that the Army can take to improve modern 
wartime contingency contracting and better prepare and train its contracting workforce 
were described. Specifically, five (5) key recommendations were offered:  implement a 
single electronic contracting system to support all Army contingency contracting efforts, 
re-examine the minimum hands-on experience requirement for contracting, capture and 
share the most current lessons learned information, re-examine the length of deployment 
for civilian contingency contracting personnel, and suggested training topics for future 
deployed contingency contracting personnel. The authors close this project with a 
statement made by Mr. Jeff Parsons, which sums up the important role that Army 
contracting plays in overall mission success: 
The commitment of our contracting professionals and to our contracting 
professionals must be 100 percent. They must stay focused on supporting 
the warfighter, and inspire the confidence of the American people. This 
will not be easy; it will take time, but getting it done is essential. We 





                                                 
85 Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives; by Mr. Jeffrey 
P. Parson, Executive Director Army Contracting Command p. 5-6. 
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APPENDIX A – SURVEY QUESTIONS 
TITLE: UNITED STATES ARMY CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING OPERATIONS: 
EMERGING ROLES, PROCEDURES and CHALLENGES FACING CONTRACT 
SPECIALISTS 
 
PURPOSE: The Purpose of this survey is to gather information for the Joint Applied Project to be 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Science in 
Contract Management for the Naval Postgraduate School.  
 
JUSTIFICATION: This Joint Applied Project will evaluate current Army contracting procedures 
for Contingency Contracting Operations.  Specifically, it will assess the following: ‘In what ways 
have the roles, responsibilities, procedures, and challenges of U.S. Army contract specialists 
changed to accommodate wartime needs and expectations?’ 
 
The surveys we collect from relevant stakeholders, (including Army contingency contracting 
officers and specialists who have deployed) will provide us with ‘boots on the ground’ insight 
into current contingency contracting processes, procedures, and challenges. The survey results 
along with independent research shall be used to develop recommendations and/or tools that the 
Army can implement to improve modern wartime contingency contracting and better prepare the 
United States’ contracting workforce to support future contingency operations.   
 




1. I have supported/worked-on contingency contracting operations involving the following 
countries? (Check all the apply) 
 
________ IRAQ   
________ Afghanistan        
________ Kuwait       
________ Kosovo       
________ Bosnia         
________ Liberia       
________ Somalia       
________ Other (please list ‘other’ country) ___________          
 
2. About how many years of contracting experience did you have prior to “deploying” in support 




3. While deployed, what was your primary job title?  
 
________ Contracting Officer    
________ Contract Specialist    
________ Ordering Officer       
________ Other                 
 
4. I have used the following in support of contingency contracting operations: (Check all that 
apply) 
 
Action Types        
 
________ Sealed Bidding, FAR Part 14                   
________ Service Contracting, FAR Part 37 
________ Supplies 
________ Construction, FAR Part 36 
________ Emergency Acquisition, FAR Part 18 
________ Information Technology, FAR Part 39 
________ Simplified Acquisition Procedures, FAR Part 13 
________ Contracting By Negotiation, FAR Part 15 
________ Non-Competitive Procedures 
________ Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA) 
________ Letter Contracts 
________ Federal Supply Schedules, FAR Part 38 
________ Oral Solicitations/Oral Agreements 
________ Purchase Cards 
________ SF 44 and Cash 
________ Use of In-Country Contracts Only 
________ Acquisition of Commercial Items, FAR Part 12 
________ Non-Commercial Acquisition 




________ Firm Fixed Price (FFP) 
________ Firm Fixed Incentive Fee (FPIF) 
________ Fixed Price Award Fee  
________ Fixed Price Level of Effort 
________ Fixed Price Redetermination 
________ Fixed Price with Economic Price Adjustment 
________ Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) 
________ Time and Materials (T&M)  
________ Labor Hours 
________ Cost No Fee 
________ Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) 
________ Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) 
________ Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) 
________ Cost Sharing 
________ Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) 
________ Purchase Orders (PO) 
________ Requirements Contract 
________ Other ______________ 
 
5. Approximate average dollar value of contracts/awards you supported in theater? 
 
________ $0 – 2.5K 
________ $2.5K - $200K 
________ $201K - $500K 
________ $501K - $1M 
________ $1M – $5.5M 
________ $5.5M – $100M 
________ $101M – $500M + 
 
6. What types of items/services were you involved in procuring in theatre? 
 
________ Bulk Transportation 




________ Quality of Life/MWR Requirements 
________ Construction Supplies and Services 
________ Office Equipment/Furniture 





________ Communication Equipment 




CURRENT TRAINING PROCEDURES: 
 
1. Prior to deploying, did you receive formal contingency contracting training?     
 
YES_______ NO _______ 
 
2. If you answered yes above, check all of the following courses which you attended: 
 
________ CON 234 “Contingency Contracting” 
________ DAU Equivalent to CON 234 
________ Anti-terrorism Training 
________ Ethics Training 
________ Cultural Awareness Training 
________ Other Agency Provided Course 
________ Not Applicable as answer to question 1 is NO 
 
3. Please indicate for each course below your perception concerning course effectiveness.   
Check “N/A” for courses not attended. 
 
This course was effective and prepared me for a contingency contracting deployment. 
 








This course was effective and prepared me for a contingency contracting deployment. 
 






























This course was effective and prepared me for a contingency contracting deployment. 
 









This course was effective and prepared me for a contingency contracting deployment. 
 









4. Once deployed, about how long did it take you to learn different contracting processes and 
procedures, i.e., what was your learning curve from traditional CONUS contracting to OCONUS 
contingency contracting? 
 
________ years     ________ months 
 
5. Prior to your deployment, did you receive certification in contracting as required by the 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)? 
 
_____ Level I Certification obtained 
_____ Level II Certification obtained 










1. While deployed, on average, approximately what percentage of the time did you have internet 
access:  
 
_______ Percent of the time 
 
2. While deployed, circle whether you had access to and if you used any of the following: 
        Access to   Used 
 
FAR/DFARS/AFARS:   Yes or No Access        Yes or Not Used 
Sample contracts:     Yes or No Access        Yes or Not Used 
Sample ARP Documents:   Yes or No Access        Yes or Not Used 
Document Templates:   Yes or No Access        Yes or Not Used 
On-the-Job Training:   Yes or No Access        Yes or Not Used 
 




3. Please indicate for each item below your perception concerning applicability in completing 
overseas contracting activities.  Check ‘N/A” for items not used. 
 









   
The below contract tool helped me complete my overseas contracting duties.  







   
The below contract tool helped me complete my overseas contracting duties.  
















   










4. What additional or improved tools would increase overseas contracting capability and improve 
overseas Contingency Contracting Officer performance? 
 
5. I had access to and read “lessons-learned” documents prior to my deployment.  
 
Access to     Read 
 
Yes      Yes 
No      No 
 
6. If you answered yes to the above question, please indicate your perception that reading prior 







IMPROVING FUTURE PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES 
 
 
1. Check any of the following resources which you feel were “lacking” in availability during your 
deployment:    
 
________ FAR/DFARS/AFARS    
________ Sample contracts     
________ Sample ARP Documents   
________ Document Templates   
________ On-the-Job Training 
________ Other ___________________ 
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2. Prioritize what you believe to be the most difficult challenges facing all overseas Contingency 
Contracting Personnel.  (1 = biggest challenge; 2 = next biggest challenge, etc) 
 
________ Lack of Training 
________ Time Pressure 
________ Hostile Environment 
________ Long Working Hours 
________ Lack of Support 
________ Other_________ 
 
3. Check the items below which you believe can improve modern wartime contingency 
contracting, including Army preparedness to support future contingency operations? 
 
________ Simulated Contract Environment (similar to Military War Games) 
________ Contingency Contracting Officer Basic Training prior to deployment 
________ Electronic Contract Files  
________ Mentor-Protégé Program 
________ Sample Contracts  
________Sample Contractual Documents (For example, Sample Statements of Work,  
     Deviations/Waivers, Pre/Post Price Negotiation Memos) 
________ Other__________________________ 
 
4. Check any/all of the below training topics which you believe the Army should focus on in 
order to improve the overall contracting process? 
 
________ Cultural/Social Implications 
________ Anti-Terrorism/Security Training 
________ Ethical Considerations 
________ Business Transactions/Procedures Specific to Area 
________ Unique Contract Requirements  
________ Base Operations Support 
________ Fund Types / Fiscal Policy in Contingency Operations 
________ Oral Solicitations 
________ Simplified Acquisition Procedures 
________ Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCA) 
________ Purchase Cards 
________ Cash Transactions 
________ Letter Contracts 
________ Market Research In-Country 
________ Local Vendor Base/Experience 
________ Host Nation Agreements/Status of Forces/Treaties  
________ Cost/Price Analysis 
________ Review of Wartime and Emergency Legislation 
________ Review of Existing Authority to Expedite Contract Actions 
________ Contract Closeout 
________ Other ________________________ 
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APPENDIX B – YODER THREE-TIER MODEL 
The goal of the Yoder Three Tier Model is to maximize effectiveness and 
efficiency of theater contingency contracting operations.  The model outlines three tiers 
of employment for contingency contracting officers: the Ordering Officer Model, the 
Leveraging Contracting Officer Model, and the Integrated Planner and Executor Model.    
The Ordering Officer is the simplest model, providing basic contract support, 
such as placing orders on existing contracts or contractual actions under the Simplified 
Acquisition procedures. This level of contracting support would require DAWIA Level I 
or II contracting certification, and DAU CON 234 training. Civilian GS-07 or GS-09 
1102 series civilians or Junior to mid-enlisted junior officers would be best suited at this 
tier. 
At the next tier, the position of Leveraging Contracting Officer would include all 
the functions of the Ordering Officer with additional higher level duties such as 
interfacing with local and regional businesses, creating business processes, and 
coordinating with military, non-governmental organizations, private volunteer 
organizations, and political organizations. This level of contracting support would require 
DAWIA Level II or III contracting certification and DAU CON 234 training.  The 
civilian GS-1102-11+ series or military senior enlisted, junior to mid-grade officers 
would best be suited for the contract support needed at this tier. 
The third and highest level of the Yoder Three Tier Model is the Integrated 
Planner and Executor (IPE).  This level of contracting support would require DAWIA 
Level III contracting certification, other additional DAWIA certifications such as LOG, 
ACQ or FIN, and a Master’s degree or higher.  The civilian GS1102-13+ and/or SES 
1102 series or military senior officers would best be suited for the contracting support 
needed at this tier. Contingency Contracting Officers with extensive experience and 
education are integrated into the operational-planning phases of contingencies. This 
integration is “essential to achieve desired synergies between the myriad organizations  
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involved in and participating in contingency environments.86  The principles of the Yoder 
Three-Tier Model will be taken into consideration in developing recommendations based 
on the analysis of the aforementioned thesis questions.  
                                                 
86 CDR E. Cory Yoder.  (December 2004). The Yoder Three-tier Model for Optimal Planning and Execution of 
Contingency Contracting, pp. 1-21.  
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